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ABSTRACT 
 
The Use of Cultural Memory in Reinforcing Contemporary Russian Patriotism on the 
Example of Film Stalingrad (2013) 
Laura Roop 
 According to cultural memory theory, cultural tools such as texts and symbols transmit 
the knowledge of meaningful historical events to groups. These cultural tools reproduce 
history by cultivating narratives that are relevant in a given time, and thus reflect the ongoing 
concerns over memory. The purpose of communicating significant turning points in a nation’s 
history is to create a system of values, a self-image and a continuity of a nation. Films are 
considered to be both textual and visual representation of cultural memory. Since memory and 
commemoration of the Second World War have gone through many changes, one has to 
analyze how cultural memory has influenced the portrayal as well as the reception of the 
event. The aim of this master’s thesis is to bring out what kind of narratives and symbols are 
used in the film Stalingrad, which was produced in 2013, in order to foster patriotism in 
contemporary Russia. Stalingrad, directed by Fyodor Bondarchuk, screenplay by Ilya Tilkin 
and Sergey Snezhkin, is all-time highest-grossing war feature film in Russia that portrays the 
Battle of Stalingrad.  
 Discourse analysis is chosen as method of the research, which will incorporate 
narrative analysis, intertextual analysis and iconographic analysis. The research reveals that in 
Stalingrad influences cultural memory by using new technology, music, simple plot and by 
creating emotional attachment to characters. By applying four main narratives that are 
products of wartime portrayal of the Second World War, but which have their roots in the pre-
Soviet Russian culture: “holy war” “war to save motherland,” “a war to save Russian 
civilization,” “a battle to the death,” the film reinforces patriotism. The continuity of the 
Russian state and the connection with Old Russian culture is transmitted in the film through 
the use of Orthodox symbols and intertextuality with previous war films and literature. 
Stalingrad’s dialogue with Western films contests various narratives; on the other hand it 
justifies Russian patriotism by showing that it does not differ from American patriotism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The memory of the Second World War is used in the contemporary Russian media as a 
unifying and motivating event for the nation.
1
 For instance, the current conflict between 
Ukraine and Russia is fuelled by the various references to the Second World War; the 
Russian mass media, among others, presents Ukrainians as fascists, pointing out that the 
Ukrainian politicians are insulting the memory of the Great Patriotic War.
2
 The 
supporters of Russia in eastern Ukraine, for their part, are carrying signs such as “Glory 
to the heroes of the Second World War.”3 Furthermore, Crimea itself serves as a 
symbol: it reminds of the strong resistance to the Nazis in the beginning of the Second 
World War as well as “protecting their own” in the Crimean War.4 This illustrates that 
the memory of the war is still used both in internal and foreign affairs to make 
distinctions between good and bad, friends and enemies. In addition, the event 
perceived as “sacred” and media plays on emotions in order to involve people in public 
debates.  
From the beginning of Putin’s rule, the memory of the Second World War has 
served as a tool for the Russian nation-building process: it strengthens patriotism and 
creates a unifying Russian identity. The war plays a double function; on the one hand it 
celebrates the victory over the invaders, on the other hand it commemorates those who 
sacrificed their lives for their motherland. Although one can see the continuation of the 
Soviet myth of the Great Patriotic War, it is important to acknowledge that the 
                                                          
1
 Marko Lehti and David J. Smith, Post-Cold War Identity Politics: Northern and Baltic Experiences 
(Routledge, 2004), 233. 
2
 “На Заседании Совбеза Украинский Чиновник Оскорбил Память Жертв Второй Мировой (In 
English: On the Security Council Meeting a Ukrainian Official Insulted the Memory of the Second World 
War),” Vesti.ru, accessed April 30, 2014, http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=1345803. 
3“Харьков, Донецк И Одесса Поднимают Российские Флаги (In English: Harkhov, Donetsk, Odessa 
Are Raising Russian Flags),” Vesti.ru, accessed April 30, 2014, 
http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=1342664. 
4
 Maartje Abbenhuis, An Age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics, 1815-1914 (Cambridge University Press, 
2014), 69. 
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interpretation of the war as well as its commemoration have gone through many 
changes during the postwar era. In the Soviet period, there was first an emphasis on 
Stalin as the leader who led the nation to the heroic victory. Over time, his role 
decreased, and instead Zhukov, Brezhnev and the Communist Party took credit for the 
victory and the celebrations of the war became institutionalized. Nowadays, the 
Orthodox Church occupies a central position in the commemoration of the war, 
replacing the communist ideology with religious images and symbols. Celebrations and 
commemorations are one way the state can enforce its own interpretation on people. 
Popular pressure, however, can also make demands and the state has to acknowledge 
the importance of particular events, since they are deeply rooted in people’s 
consciousness. For instance, developments in the post-Soviet Russian Federation 
demonstrated early on that even if the authorities wished to cancel the celebrations of 
the Second World War, they had to change their minds, because of the fear of losing 
popular support.
5
 
In order to understand why the Second World War, as the greatest achievement 
of the Soviet Union, is promoted by the Russian state nowadays, one has to look at the 
war from the perspective of cultural memory. The Second World War is a “fixed point,” 
an event, whose memory has been preserved by cultural tools and institutional 
communication throughout decades.
6
 There are numerous documentary footages, 
photos, paintings, history textbooks, literary books and films that portray the war, and 
thus can be seen as products and agents of cultural memory. These cultural tools 
transmit knowledge of the event to the nation, tell the story of the greatest achievement 
through narratives that reflect the time they were created and received. Although the 
memory of the Second World War is constantly transformed over the time the stories 
are told, the importance of the event stays the same: it is still the event that makes 
distinctions between “us” and “them” and states the victory over invaders.  
                                                          
5
 Lehti and Smith, Post-Cold War Identity Politics, 233; Nina Turmakin, “Myth and Memory in Soviet 
Society,” Society 24, no. 6 (1987): 69; Zhan T. Toshchenko, “Historical Consciousness and Historical 
Memory: An Analysis of the Current Situation,” Russian Studies in History 49, no. 1 (Summer 2010): 41; 
Sergei Kudryashov, “Remembering and Researching the War: The Soviet and Russian Experience,” in 
Experience and Memory: The Second World War in Europe (New York, Oxford: Berghahn, 2010), 86–
97. 
6
 See more: Jan Assmann, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,” New German Critique, no. 65 
(1995): 129. 
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Kilbourn states that nowadays “memory derives its primary meaning, its 
existence as such, from visually based technologies like cinema.”7 Film is considered to 
be an effective agent of cultural memory, because it influences the perception of the 
past and helps people to remember.
8
 For instance, polls taken in Russia in 2002 
(“Historical memory of the Russian population”) by Egorov et al. and in 2005 (“The 
war in historical memory of Russians”) by Afanasieva and Merkushin demonstrated that 
people learn most about history in school; however, films took second place.
9
 Hence, 
film is a very important source of information about history in Russia. On the basis of 
this information, a notion of shared past is constructed, which in turn unites a nation and 
shapes its identity.
10
 Through offering portraits of heroic achievements and fateful 
events, film also communicates nation’s values, mission and loyalty to the state, thus it 
can have the ambition to foster patriotism. 
Popular film is an especially effective tool in communicating shared past to 
communities, because it reaches large audiences, visualizes the story, is interesting and 
catchy, and can be replayed. Story and technology allow people to get information 
about the past easily without doing much independent work; therefore, film is 
considered much more influential in creating a unifying identity than textbooks or 
novels.
11
 The war narratives in film are also usually simplified and the protagonists are 
presented in a way that the public could identify themselves with the heroes.
12
 Since 
film tends to influence people emotionally, the information that is transmitted is also 
better remembered. Furthermore, film gives the impression that viewers are 
experiencing the events themselves, which means that they take it closer to heart and 
see it as part of their life.  
                                                          
7
 Russell J. A. Kilbourn, Cinema, Memory, Modernity: The Representation of Memory from the Art Film 
to Transnational Cinema, Routledge Advances in Film Studies 6 (New York: Routledge, 2010), 1. 
8
 Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning, eds., Media and Cultural Memory : Cultural Memory Studies : An 
International and Interdisciplinary Handbook (Berlin, DEU: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 5.  
9
 А.И. Афанасьева and В.И. Меркушин, “Великая Отечественная Война В Исторической Памяти 
Россиян (In English: Great Patriotic War in the Historicla Memory of Russians),” Социологические 
Исследования, 2005, 11–22. 
10
 Elazar Barkan, The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices, 1st ed (New 
York: Norton, 2000), x. 
11
 Anton Kaes, “History and Film: Public Memory in the Age of Electronic Dissemination,” History and 
Memory Vol. 2, no. No. 1 (Fall 1990): 111–29, 111-114. 
12
 Gary R. Edgerton and Peter C. Rollins, eds., Television Histories: Shaping Collective Memory in the 
Media Age (Lexington, Ky: University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 1-8. 
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Gary R. Edgerton and Peter C. Rollins explain that television history uses the 
past “as a kind of communal, mythic response to current controversies, issues, and 
challenges” and “facilitates a society's ongoing negotiation with its usable past by 
portraying those parts of the collective memory that are most relevant at any given 
time.”13 The fact that the Second World War receives more and more attention from 
television, in forms of fiction, documentaries or news stories, proves that the topic is 
relevant in contemporary Russia. It shows that media channels, filmmakers and people 
are preoccupied with the meaning of war. Furthermore, we see that authorities are not 
only encouraging the transmission of the Second World War memory, but they are also 
dictating the way the event should be interpreted. For example, the Presidential 
Commission held a roundtable on the November 19, 2012 where the state decided to 
protect Russian historical memory, which among others includes the liberation of 
Europe from the fascists, by introducing legislation that punishes the rehabilitation of 
Nazism, and by stimulating the production and distribution of TV and radio programs 
that popularize history.
14
 This demonstrates that the interest in the Second World War is 
not only based on public demand, it is “usable past” for the state in order to promote a 
special form of patriotism, i.e. respect for their motherland. Stalingrad serves as one of 
the examples of the popularization of history, since the production was partly supported 
by the Ministry of Culture of Russian Federation shortly after the roundtable.
15
 
Film is also a creation, and it is thus important to see how cultural memory itself 
has influenced the production of a particular film. The director and writer belong to the 
community, they are similarly influenced by the cultural context that they live in. 
Subsequently one can see film both as a product of cultural memory and as an agent that 
carries memory further; film allows us to see not only what is remembered from the 
war, but also how it is remembered and by whom. 
                                                          
13
 Ibid. 
14
 “О Противодействии Попыткам Фальсификации Истории Народов В Ущерб Интересам России 
(In English: Countering the Attempts to Falsify Nation’s History in Order to Harm Russian Interests),” 
November 19, 2012, http://council.gov.ru/activity/activities/roundtables/30331. 
15
 “Владимир Мединский Озвучил Результаты Работы По Поддержке Отечественного 
Кинематографа (Vladimir Medisnki Announced the Results of the Support for Domestic Cinema)” 
(Министерство культуры Российской Федерации, December 2, 2014), http://mkrf.ru/press-
tsentr/novosti/ministerstvo/vladimir-medinskiy-ozvuchil-rezultaty-raboty-po-podderzhke-
otechestvennogo-kinem. 
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This thesis analyzes how the film Stalingrad promotes patriotism through the 
use of cultural memory. Stalingrad was directed by Fedor Bondarchuk, its screenplay 
written by Ilya Tilkin and Sergey Snezhkin based on Vassili Grossman’s novel “Life 
and Fate.” The film was released in September 2013 in Volgograd. It is a feature film 
that portrays the Battle of Stalingrad in 3D format. Stalingrad became a blockbuster that 
was shown in the cinema as well on TV, therefore it is an excellent example of 
popularization of history that reached large audiences. As a cultural memory tool, this 
film transmits contemporary perception of the Second World War that is considered as 
one of the grounding myths for Russian nation-building. 
The first chapter of the thesis explains the concepts of cultural memory, and its 
connection with national identity, politics of memory and patriotism. The different 
levels of interaction between film and memory will be analyzed, as well as the different 
techniques that film as an audio-visual medium employs in order to have effects on 
cultural memory. This discussion also provides the framework for subsequent analysis 
by explaining the methodology used.  
The second chapter of the thesis gives an historical overview of cinema’s role in 
the Soviet nation-building process. In addition, the development of Soviet Second 
World War films will be summarized to demonstrate the changes in the perception of 
the war over time. By showing how the war has been portrayed previously one can 
understand the cultural context of contemporary films. Since filmmakers and audience 
are influenced by the previous narratives and war film traditions, this will eventually 
affect the production as well as the reception of the 2013 film Stalingrad.  
The third chapter of the thesis concentrates on the film analysis from the 
perspective of cultural memory. This part distinguishes particular ways how the 
portrayal of the Battle of Stalingrad in film influences the interpretation of the war. It is 
also important to see, how previous cultural context is incorporated into the film in 
order to communicate the meaning of the event. Since patriotism is reinforced by the 
use of symbols and narratives, the chapter also distinguishes narratives used in the film 
and analyze how they coincide with the contemporary development is the contemporary 
Russian society.  
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CHAPTER ONE: CULTURAL MEMORY AND FILM 
 
Memory, according to Dennet and Westbury, is “the ability to store useful information 
and to retrieve it in precisely those circumstances and that form which allow it to be 
useful”.16 Similarly, Jedlowski sees memory as “the human faculty of preserving certain 
traces of past experience and having access to these – at least in part – through recall.”17 
“Storing” or “preserving” memories means that they are not generally in use, they need 
triggers in order to appear, or as Maurice Halbwachs explains, they are unconscious and 
become conscious only when they are revived.
18
 On this basis, one can understand that 
people need particular events, rituals, or stories to recollect their memories and recall 
important past events. It does not mean, however, that the memories are static or remain 
the same over the course of time. Memory studies show that people do not remember 
accurately and that their memories change depending on the time and circumstances.
19
 
As Pierre Nora states, memory “remains in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of 
remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to 
manipulation and appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically 
revived”.20 Memory is complicated, it can transform spontaneously, or it can be 
changed through institutions, however it is always connected with a particular time.  
The conceptualizer of collective memory, Halbwachs suggests that people 
reconstruct their memories due to the social pressure: “[S]ociety from time to time 
obligates people not just reproduce in thought previous events of their lives, but also to 
touch them up, to shorten them, or to complete them so that, however convinced we are 
that our memories are exact, we give them a prestige that in reality they did not 
possess.” Collective memory acknowledges that individual memory is strongly linked to 
social contexts; however, it makes a distinctive line between social and cultural 
                                                          
16
 Daniel C. Dennett and Chris Westbury, “Mining The Past To Construct The Future: Memory and 
Belief as Forms of Knowledge,” in Memory, Brain, and Belief (Harvard University Print, 2000), 11–32, 
13. 
17
 Paolo Jedlowski, “Memory and Sociology Themes and Issues,” Time & Society 10, no. 1 (March 1, 
2001): 29–44, 29. 
18
 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, The Heritage of Sociology (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 39.  
19
 Jedlowski, “Memory and Sociology Themes and Issues,” 30-32. 
20
 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire,” Representations, no. 26 (April 1, 
1989): 7–24, 8. 
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frameworks and does not regard latter in the concept of memory, rather sees it as 
tradition.21 Since film connects fictional texts with visual images, its role in the 
contemporary Russian memory cannot be wholly analyzed from the perspective of 
collective memory.  
Cultural Memory 
 
Cultural memory theorists Jan and Aleida Assmann developed Halbwachs’ concept of 
collective memory further and state that there is a need to distinguish two different 
terms on the basis of temporal structure “communicative memory” and “cultural 
memory.”22 Communicative memory is a synchronic memory space that is given further 
from one generation to another, while cultural memory is diachronic and reaches far 
back in time.23 Communicative memory is based on socialization and transmits 
autobiographical accounts of recent events, reflects values, attitudes, beliefs of 
generations, and thus helps people to “live in groups and communities.”24 Although 
cultural memory functions also as a bonding memory, its content is different due to its 
temporal range. According to Jan Assmann, cultural memory carries further the 
“mythical history” of groups with the help of objectified culture, such as texts, images 
and rituals. Therefore, it involves not only social but also cultural context.25 
The Second World War is an event that still fits to the temporal range of 
communicative memory: there are eyewitnesses alive and the information is passed 
further with vernacular language. However, as soon as communicative memory takes 
the form of a cultural product, for example literature or film, it uses formalized 
language, symbols, emplotted narratives, and therefore is considered as cultural 
memory.26 Here, one can see the Second World War as a “fixed point,” a “figure” of 
cultural memory: a meaningful event that is communicated to the audience through 
different cultural formations. Since it has become a “myth,” a formative text that 
                                                          
21
 Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, 51–53; Jan Assmann, Religion and Cultural Memory: Ten Studies 
(Stanford University Press, 2006), 8. 
22
 Erll and Nünning, Media and Cultural Memory, 109-117. 
23
 Assmann, Religion and Cultural Memory, 8. 
24
 Christian Emden and David R. Midgley, Cultural Memory and Historical Consciousness in the 
German-Speaking World Since 1500: Papers from the Conference “The Fragile Tradition”, Cambridge 
2002 (Peter Lang, 2004), 22–24; Erll and Nünning, Media and Cultural Memory, 109. 
25
 Erll and Nünning, Media and Cultural Memory, 5, 109–117. 
26
 Assmann, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,” 128. 
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constitutes identity and helps to define oneself, the war receives also a different 
temporality, and it no longer is connected with real time.
27
 
All cultures have developed forms of communications and ways to preserve 
information that is necessary for formation and continuation of cultural memory.28 
Precondition for cultural heritage is thus, the existence of “objectification or 
crystallization of communicated meaning and collectively shared knowledge.”29 This 
information is transmitted and stored with the help of text; however, the meaning of text 
in cultural memory, as already constituted, is not only written or oral accounts, but also 
images, sounds and customs.30  
 Cultural memory is similarly to individual memory divided into two categories 
based on their functions: “active memory” and “archival memory.” The first implies on 
the texts that are currently in use, the latter on the other hand resembles to individual 
involuntary memory that becomes active only through recall.31 According to Jan 
Assmann, activating cultural memory means that people “turn to the archive of cultural 
traditions, the arsenal of symbolic forms, the imaginary of myths and images, of the 
great stories, sagas and legends, scenes and constellations.”32 The “figures of memory” 
are activated, however, based on present needs, their meaning is interpreted through 
contemporary perspective. Since every era relates differently to the information - by 
criticizing, appropriating, preserving or transforming – one event can be seen very 
differently depending on the particular context.33 For instance, the next chapter about 
the development of the Second World War memory in Soviet and Russian cinema 
illustrates how differently the war was portrayed in different eras. The main questions: 
who should take the credit for the victory, as well how it was fought and by whom, are 
constantly under observation. The importance of the event for the nation, however, has 
almost never been questioned, the evidence of which are numerous films, literary books, 
and monuments on this topic. 
                                                          
27
 Ibid., 129; Assmann, Religion and Cultural Memory, 38. 
28
 Emden and Midgley, Cultural Memory and Historical Consciousness, 31. 
29
 Assmann, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,” 130. 
30
 Assmann, Religion and Cultural Memory, 7–8; Emden and Midgley, Cultural Memory and Historical 
Consciousness, 31. 
31
 Emden and Midgley, Cultural Memory and Historical Consciousness, 31. 
32
 Assmann, Religion and Cultural Memory, 7–8. 
33
 Ibid., 130-132. 
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These cultural memory tools, on the other hand cultivate memory of the Second 
World War, which means that the remembrance of the event is organized. Cultural 
memory “depends on specialized practices,” on “canonized texts” that are institutionally 
communicated to groups.34 Erecting monuments or organizing celebrations are similar 
practices as producing films: they all work as “memory aids” and help to not forget the 
significant events.35 In addition, constant attention on one event and institutional 
selection of its elements and the ways it is portrayed, not only stresses the relevancy, but 
makes it sacred and thus turns it into canon.36 The Second World War films were 
canonized already in the Soviet period and contemporary Russian cinema uses these 
canons in fostering the importance of the event to the nation.37 Therefore, it is necessary 
to understand what the purpose of the cultivation is. 
The fact that the Second World War is significant or made significant through 
canonization means that it carries values significant for the group. Jan Assmann states 
that cultural memory supplies group with knowledge and symbols that are necessary for 
a “normative self-image” as well as for their system of values. 38 Heiko Pääbo’s 
comparative study on Russian, Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian master narratives 
reveals that Russian self-image is predominantly positive and stresses the glorifying 
elements. According to him, the glorification is mainly connected with the military, 
political and cultural achievements. The greatest heroic accomplishment is considered 
to be the victory in the Second World War that constructs the image of a “defender of 
peace and just cause.”39 Russians also consider their culture to be very distinctive and 
thus believe to have a unique civilization that was established already over thousand 
years ago by Kievan Rus.40 Acknowledging that master narratives are constructed with 
the help of cultural memory, the heroic self-image and the representative of distinct 
                                                          
34
 Assmann, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,” 131. 
35
 Assmann, Religion and Cultural Memory, 8–9. 
36
 Ibid., 19. 
37
 Александра Талавер, “Память О Великой Отечественной Войне В Постсоветском 
Кинематографе (In English: Memory of the Great Patriotic War in Post-Soviet Cinema),” Философия И 
Исследования Культуры, Этапы осмысления прошлого (от 1990-х к 2000-м, Т16 (2013): 28; Denise 
J. Youngblood, Russian War Films: On the Cinema Front, 1914-2005 (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2007), 231. 
38
 Assmann, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,” 131–132. 
39
 Heiko Pääbo, Potential of Collective Memory Based International Identity Conflicts in Post-Imperial 
Space: Comparison of Russian Master Narrative with Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian Master 
Narratives (PhD diss., Tartu University Press, 2011), 257–260. 
40
 Ibid., 260. 
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Russian civilization is thus the product of cultural tools that binds a group, by 
educating, civilizing and offering “rules of conduct.”41 
Self-image, on the other hand is connected with making clear distinctions 
between “us” and “them.” Jan Assmann points out that the main characteristic of 
cultural memory is that it “preserves the store of knowledge from which a group derives 
an awareness of its unity and peculiarity.”42 Thus, cultural tools, such as stories, 
celebrations, symbols, help to define group’s identity by determining who belongs to 
the group and who does not. If cultural memory accumulates and mediates knowledge 
of ancestors to groups, unites communities on the basis of “mythical histories,” and 
presents historical events from current perception, then it serves also as a precondition 
for nation-building.  
 
National Identity, Politics of Memory and Patriotism in Cultural Memory 
 
Ethno-symbolist approach in nationalism studies perceives very close connection 
between cultural memory and national identity. According to Anthony D. Smith, among 
other phenomena, national identity incorporates “historical myths and memories,” i.e. 
cultural memory.
43
 One can understand that people need memories in order to know 
who they are, both on the individual and on the group level. This explains the overall 
preoccupation with the past among nations, which try to find the legitimization for their 
own state’s existence by looking back at history. However, as Aleida Assmann notes, 
nations do not have a memory, they create their memory through “memorial signs.”44 
These signs like monuments, symbols or texts, carry connective semantics and help to 
construct national identity.
45 
 
Religion is very significant for the formation of national identity, since it unites 
people through different rituals, customs and ceremonies that are continuously 
                                                          
41
 Assmann, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,” 131–132. 
42
 Ibid., 130. 
43
 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (University of Nevada Press, 1991), 14. 
44
 Emden and Midgley, Cultural Memory and Historical Consciousness, 26. 
45
 Ibid.; Assmann, Religion and Cultural Memory, 11. 
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practiced, thus creating a symbolic foundation for the public culture.
46
 Furthermore, 
Northrop Frye sees Christian religion as a “great code”, meaning that culture is very 
closely related to the religion: works of art refer to biblical themes and in order to 
interpret them, one has to know Christian myths. Frye’s concept of myth coincides with 
Asmmann’s, it is a “sacred” story that transfers important lessons, values and 
ideology.
47
 Thus, religion serves as a medium as well as an archive of information about 
nation’s (culture’s) past; it connects generations across centuries or millennia and 
constitutes the continuation of a community.
48
 In addition, Smith asserts that religion is 
the most effective way to create national identity, because it allows people to believe 
they are chosen by God. He calls it the “election myth” and considers this also crucial 
for ethnic survival. Among others, he speaks about particular “chosen peoples,” for 
instance Russians have seen their state as “the sole bastion of Orthodoxy in an heretical 
world, the third Rome” already from 1453, when the Byzantine empire was 
extinguished. The Tsar became a “‘father’ to his chosen people in holy ‘mother 
Russia.’”49 The “gendered political emblems of motherland and fatherland” in turn, 
together with distinctive flags was another step in the nation-building, because it 
distinguished one group from another.
50
 
Cultural memory not only offers the content for national identity, but also serves 
as a medium. In order to assure homogeneity, national identity needs to be 
communicated to all the members of the group and, according to Smith, this is done 
through “mass culture.” In his opinion, education and mass media are effective tools in 
uniting people by transmitting the narratives that constitute a nation.
51
 Since mass media 
itself “refers to forms and texts that work in unison to generate specific dominant or 
popular representations of events, people, and places,” it is important to acknowledge 
that films as mass media are in fact used in the nation-building process by presenting 
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historical events or myths that are important to a particular nation, thus creating a 
unifying identity beyond village or town.
52
 
Aleida Assmann asserts that cultural memory “translates and transcends the 
other memory formats” including political.53 Political construction of memory, therefore 
relies similarly to national identity on cultural practices, myths and symbols that are 
provided by cultural memory.54 Both Jan and Aleida Assmann state that political 
memory thrives to unite people on the basis of remembering significant events or 
myths. 55 The characteristics of political memory are thus emotionally charged narratives 
that supply people with stimulating message and continuous reactivation of visual signs 
and performative action. However, only these parts of the past are used that foster a 
positive self-image and support future goals.
56
 Similarly, one can observe that 
Stalingrad transmits a heroic event with a simple plot; it accentuates the greatest battle 
of The Second World War that is considered to have changed the course of the war. The 
reason why the Battle of Stalingrad is necessary to communicate to contemporary 
audience is that it portrays the state as a great power, and nation as invincible and brave.  
According to Jan Assmann, the “participation structure of cultural memory has 
an inherent tendency to elitism; it is never strictly egalitarian”.57 Institutions control or 
channel their interpretation of the nation’s past to those who inhabit it. Erik Meyer 
frames the concept of memory politics with two practices: “policy for the past” 
(Geschichtspolitik) and “politics of history” (Vergangenheitspolitik). The latter can be 
used in states where there is transition from a totalitarian to a democratic regime, and 
provides an account of how societies come to terms with the past. Geschichtspolitik, on 
the other hand, deals with the history of a community that has controversial 
understandings of past events. Politics of history is accordingly when actors gain 
political power through transmitting their interpretation of history and influence public 
debates to reshape the narrative. Moreover, public political communication is mainly 
                                                          
52
 Marita Sturken and Lisa Cartwright, Practices of Looking: An Introduction to Visual Culture (Oxford ; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 151-153.  
53
 Emden and Midgley, Cultural Memory and Historical Consciousness, 36. 
54
 Ibid., 35. 
55
 Assmann, Religion and Cultural Memory, 7; Emden and Midgley, Cultural Memory and Historical 
Consciousness, 35. 
56
 Emden and Midgley, Cultural Memory and Historical Consciousness, 26-28. 
57
 Erll and Nünning, Media and Cultural Memory,116. 
 
 
13 
 
performed via mass media. Meyer explains that in this case there is a competition for 
“hegemony” over the narratives and interpretations not only among politicians, but also 
among academics and journalists.
58
 Since competing discourses presented to the public 
influence collective memory and national identity, the politics of history is not solely 
the dominion of authorities. If films are in fact able to change or modify what people 
think they know about the past, one can easily add filmmakers or the sponsors of films 
to this category. 
Some scholars are reluctant to label everything as an intentional transmission 
from above. One should not see politics of memory only as a “manipulation” by the 
elites, instead it is necessary to see that memory operates also from below. Winter and 
Sivan highlight that “much ‘memory work’ goes on spontaneously within civil society, 
especially after salient or dramatic events”.59 Looking at film as a mechanism for 
communicating past narratives, it is important to be aware that its creators are also part 
of the nation; they are influenced by the same cultural memory that they share with the 
rest of the group. It means that they produce films or incorporate events that are 
important for them as representatives of their shared culture. They can also produce 
films that are interesting for the audience, thus they try to meet public demands by 
incorporating present concerns of their society over history and memory that stimulate 
or engage public attention. 
National identity, or belonging to one community, and politics of memory, as 
organized way to foster particular remembering, are in turn preconditions for patriotism, 
which is described as loyalty to nation or state. According to Herbert C. Kelman, 
patriotism does not have to be connected to nation-state, because it is more general and 
older than the modern concept of nationalism. In addition, one can be a patriot of an 
entity that does not possess a state. However, nation-states are dependent on patriotism 
for legitimizing state existence, for ensuring popular support and loyalty.
60
 Therefore, it 
is necessary to understand that state leaders do emphasize on patriotic feeling for 
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establishing a state, or for assuring its continuity. As Carretero asserts, patriotism deals 
with values that are important for the present and the future: it is a social construction 
that is mediated with the help of culture.
61
 Patriotism similarly as national identity relies 
partly on objectified culture, such as symbols, ceremonies, rituals that is communicated 
to larger groups. It is therefore using cultural memory for both content and 
communication.  
Looking at contemporary Russian war films, Stephen M. Norris asserts, that 
they are tools for fostering Russian patriotism, since they employ sentimentality, 
emotionality and nationalistic enthusiasm for portraying war. It is also important to 
notice that one of the patriotic films Norris refers to is Company 9 (9 рота, 2005) about 
the Afghan War, directed by Fyodor Bondarchuk, who is also director of Stalingrad. 
Furthermore, contemporary Russian cinema critic Arkhangelskii sees that Bondarchuk 
in his films implements political order of fostering patriotism.
62
  
All the above mentioned concepts have one thing in common: they are all 
strongly linked with mass media, since they function effectively only when 
communicated to larger audiences. Mass media is seen as a crucial part of the 
emergence of nations in Europe. Benedict Anderson asserts that novels and newspapers 
provided “technical means” for transmitting the sense of the “imagined community” to a 
larger population.
63
 Written media was available to people who were able to read and 
therefore did not have such effects on the illiterate population. Sturken and Cartwright 
rightly point out that audio-visual media had in fact a large effect on society in the 
beginning of the twentieth century. With the emergence of audio-visual media, such as 
film and radio, illiterate masses were included within so-called “imagined communities” 
since they too had access to the narratives “beyond the word of mouth.” They also point 
out, however, that opinions among scholars differ as to whether the incorporation of 
non-literate population to the information flow supported democratization or led to 
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more state control (or the control of the producers) over society.
64
 That question is, of 
course, dependent on the particular political culture, but one can assume that totalitarian 
states are interested in controlling the population and use mass media, including films, 
to support the existing regime. For instance, Richard Taylor in his study of film 
propaganda in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, shows that authorities were well aware 
of influences of film on the people and used it as efficient tool for promoting state 
ideology as well as for nation-building process.
65
  
 
The Influences of Film on Cultural Memory 
 
One of the research questions of this thesis is concentrated on the ways how the film 
influences the interpretation of the war as well as the reception of the information about 
the event. This section explains further explains it from the perspectives of cultural 
memory theorists and psychology. 
Film as a mass medium is a powerful tool to shape society; it brings together a 
population, transfers notions of belongingness among large populations and creates a 
common cultural memory. Many researchers, however, have also pointed out that film 
offers a very efficient way of learning about historical events. There is a common 
understanding that films are more influential in obtaining knowledge about the past than 
books or schools, since they are more popular, they are entertaining, interesting, simple, 
and close to reality.
66 
Youngblood adds that films may not be the most efficient method 
in channeling historical “facts,” but they can involve people emotionally in stories that 
help in remembering narratives.
67
 Jan Assmann asserts that “only emotionally cathected 
forms of communication bring structure, perspective, relevance, definition, and horizon 
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into memory.”68 People bond emotionally with fictional events portrayed in films 
because of the narratives and characters. Already in 1934 Hadley Cantril acknowledged 
that children and adults remember the material communicated by film because of their 
emotional attachment to the movie’s plot.69 Similarly, LaBar and Cabeza’s years of 
research proved that the events arousing emotions are more likely to be remembered 
than neutral events and that “[E]motion has powerful influences on learning and 
memory.”70 Van Damme and Smets add that emotions do not only help to remember 
better and more vividly, but can also create false memories.
71
 This on the other hand 
explains, why memory is able to change depending on time. 
Mazierska asserts that the feeling of reality in films makes people believe that 
the things they viewed actually took place.
72
 Edgerton and Rollins add that television 
histories allow people to experience the events themselves and become part of them. 
They also point out that people relate to the characters on the screen and try to 
understand how the heroes must feel.
73
 Besides acquiring information from the films 
because the audio-visual components and the plot are engaging, the effect of “seeing it 
with your own eyes” and “living through” the events together with the heroes on the 
screen affects cultural memory.
74
 Based on that, the use of 3D technology in portraying 
the Second World War has the ambition to influence the reception of a historical event 
and therefore the memory of the war even more than a 2D film. There is new empirical 
research on the comparison of 3D and 2D film reception, revealing that viewers 
reported the 3D film as more realistic and engaging.
75
 The 3D technology has also 
proven to be successful for teaching different subjects in schools: it increases the ability 
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to learn and improves exam results.
76
 All in all, adding the dimension of space to a film 
that already has a tendency to influence people emotionally increases the reception of 
the historical event and therefore allows the audience to feel that they are part of the 
story. 
In addition to 3D technology, music is also playing a great role in the emotional 
reception of film. According to Annabel J. Cohen, “music sets the mood of the film” 
and “bridges the gap between the screen and the audience.” She also states that music 
adds an “emotional dimension” and allows an audience to engage in a film.77 Marilyn 
G. Boltz explains that many psychological studies prove that music affects the 
“perception, interpretation, and remembering of film information.”78 Although the genre 
of this film could be named a thriller because of its portrayal of a battle, extensive 
shooting and fire, the music throughout the film is melodramatic. Hoeckner et al. 
provide an explanation for such a choice. Their study concentrated on finding out how 
different kinds of music influence the viewer’s identification with certain characters. 
They came to the conclusion that melodramatic music provides “an interpretive context 
in which viewers would attribute to the character a distinct feeling of sadness and 
thereby increase their inclination to identify with the character.” 79 Hoeckner et al. found 
also that music helped to remember better the character’s feelings as well as the 
associated clips.
80
 
As an artistic creation, film may employ different techniques and genres, 
depending on the filmmakers’ goals. This too affects the reception of mediated 
historical narratives and its overall effects on cultural memory. For example, films can 
connect history and memory through presenting stories as someone’s memory.81 It can 
take the audience back in time, and it allows the public to experience recollection, 
especially when the film is not built as a linear story; for instance, it begins with the 
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present and a key event forces the storyteller to remember particular events, in the same 
way as memory works in real life. It is also important to acknowledge that films which 
use first-person narrative usually present the events through the prism of the 
protagonist, which on the other hand resembles the stories people hear from their 
relatives or friends. If to add the notion that films are influencing people unconsciously, 
these complicated and multilayered factors may play a role in creating and 
communicating cultural memory. 
There are also differences in reception of genres, for example, Youngblood 
explains that art films are usually complicated and if it comes to memory, then they may 
not have such a strong influence as movies offering pure entertainment. Artistic films 
usually question the master narratives and this may come into conflict with the existing 
understanding that people have. Moreover, they are composed differently, which means 
that the audience has to work harder and pay much more attention to the non-linear 
narratives. One can add that the public is conscious when receiving information, and are 
able to acknowledge that art represents the creator’s vision. Needless to say that film as 
an art form is also less popular than film as a form of entertainment. Moreover, feature 
films simplify stories that usually support the master narratives and reach wider 
audiences.
82
 
It could be said that films as the product and medium of cultural memory do 
influence memory and identity in various ways: they can reinforce master narratives, 
offer alternative accounts thus questioning master narrative, add new features to the 
existing narratives, or help to forget topics by excluding them. The visual representation 
of the past together with an interesting story-line can help people to feel that the story 
could be part of their nation’s history, but it should be supported by the master narrative 
or the other stories they have heard during their life time in order to have real effects.  
Film and Cultural Studies  
 
It is necessary to turn to the cultural studies to understand the research objects of 
cultural memory. As already established earlier, cultural memory deals with objectified 
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culture and sees texts as both the product of cultural memory as well as medium for 
communicating past events. Text, according to the cultural memory theorist, receives a 
wider meaning: it can be a painting, a ceremony, a book, or a film. Cultural studies, as 
already name presupposes, focuses on culture. Its key thinker, Stuart Hall, sees culture 
as societies’ “practices, representations, languages and customs.”83 Cultural studies 
research concentrates particularly on the “shared social meanings” i.e. how people 
understand the surrounding environments.
84
 Therefore, cultural studies are helpful in 
order to frame the present research by analyzing how the meaning is created. Since the 
present thesis concentrates also on how the portrayal of the war fosters patriotism, one 
has to see what does this war means in the context of the film.  
Semiotics has offered a very influential work in the analysis of cultural texts that 
is used both by mass media and art historians. Structuralist approach understands that 
culture should be seen in terms of its relationship to structure that lies outside of actors’ 
intentions.
85
 This approach is influenced by Saussure’s perception that language is a 
“system of signs that expresses the ideas,” and that is governed by a “code” i.e. the set 
of usage rules.
86
 As examples, Saussure brings symbolic rituals, and military signs that 
can similarly consider as a language.
87
 Language is used as a term that constitutes 
different ways of communication: pictures similarly to written accounts are means of 
communication. This understanding is also shared by Juri Lotman who considers art 
itself a “universal language,” a work of art in turn is as a text that is created in the 
language prescribed by the particular form of art.
88
  
Signs on the other hand are composed of signifiers and signifieds; however, 
Saussure asserts that the relationship between signifiers and signifieds is arbitrary, the 
meaning of signs can change depending on the time and context.
89
 In addition to 
Saussure’s concept of sign, Barthes, proposes that there are two types of signs: denoted 
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and connotative. In his opinion denoted sign carries “literary” meaning, while 
connotative sign is the product of associations with denoted sign.
90
 Thus, according to 
Barthes, there is a “second system” of language that uses signs of the first system as 
signifiers, which he calls “metalanguage”.91 In these terms a language of art could be 
seen as metalanguage, because it translates the real life into art.
92
 In relation to 
connotative sign, Barthes also explains the concept of “myth”, which he sees as 
connotations that are already rooted in culture and that transmits a particular ideology.
93
 
Here, one can see that myth is not just a story, but a sign that is a coded system of 
meanings.  
Let us now analyze the above mentioned in the context of film. Lotman asserts 
that there is a particular language of film that combines different elements: narrative is 
given further with pictures and sounds, by dividing scenes to footages, by changing 
speed of the footages, by zooming in etc. As a work of art, it means that all of these 
elements carry particular meaning and thus become signs. It is similarly important to 
acknowledge that from the structuralist standpoint, the meaning of film lies in the 
“system of relations” of all of its elements, thus one can understand the artwork only 
when to look at it as a whole.
94
 Therefore, signs should be seen in relation with other 
signs, only then one can see what the meaning is. If film consists of narratives, pictures, 
sound, motion of footages, characters, etc., one thus has to see understand what these 
elements mean not only separately but within the context of the film. There is also 
necessary to understand what signs carry which associations, are they rooted in the 
culture (myths), or the associations are created by the film.  
However, the fact that connotations are rooted in the culture acknowledges that 
it is not possible to understand the meaning of an artwork without looking at the larger 
cultural context. This leads us to poststructuralism that sees meanings are limited to one 
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particular text. As Graham Bell notes, both literary and non-literary texts do not have 
“independent meaning,” the meaning lies in the “network of textual relations.” 95 “Text 
becomes intertext,” which means that it is necessary to know all the related and 
referenced texts in order to understand the text.
96
 Intertextuality as a term was first 
marked by Julia Kristeva who saw it as “the insertion of history into a text and of this 
text into history.”97 If we add David Bordwell’s notion that cinema is composed of all 
previous arts, one may conclude that film itself is by nature intertextual.
98
 Like all other 
texts, film is never finished; it will not end with screening, since film can be differently 
understood by different viewers in different times, furthermore, the same person can 
interpret a film differently when watching it several times. The reception of film is 
always connected with the associations people have, which in turn depends on all the 
texts they have previously processed.  
Art historian Erwin Panofsky similarly to poststucturalists sees that art cannot be 
separated from previous texts or from the cultural context, but he adds a personalized 
vision to the interpretation and production.
99
 Hasenmueller sees that Panofsky’s work 
can partly be considered semiotic, because he too asserts the dual character to signs 
(according to her in Panofsky’s vocabulary sign is a motif, connotative sign is image), 
and is concerned with artwork’s “deeper” meaning, however, his perception is that the 
system of signs is incomplete and secondary.
100
 Images and complex of images (stories, 
allegories), according to Panofsky, carry conventional meanings, thus to interpret them 
“knowledge of literary sources” is applied. The analysis of this kind of interpretation is 
iconographic and understanding of artwork’s meaning is connected with person’s 
identity and experience.
101
 Panofsky asserts the work of art is created by real people, 
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who produced art within a concrete period of time in a particular place; therefore, an 
artist himself is influenced by the artistic environment and traditions.
102
  
Panofsky  that film is subject to “principles of coexpressibility”, one has to 
acknowledge that the film is interpreted as a combination of sound and picture. 
Expression is, according to Panofsky, one part of the interpretation: film arouses 
emotions and gives impressions. However, these impressions are manipulated by the 
producers, because audience sees the picture through the lens of a camera (for example 
magnification, camera angle).
103
 Thus, similarly to the semiotics, Panofsky sees that the 
elements that film is composed of, all carry meanings. One of the tasks of the 
iconographic film analyze would be to recognize that there is a meaning for those 
elements. Another is to establish the meaning of images and this is done through 
applying conventional understandings and seeing “standardized appearance”.104 
Although Panofsky acknowledges the role of environment and producers, which means 
that one could include the political sphere to the iconographical analysis – it does 
reflects on the outcome of artwork, since artist is similarly influences by the political 
culture as everyone else. However, Panofsky does not analyze the ways how artwork in 
turn influences audience. 
Cultural theorist Stuart Hall derived from Marxist concept of cultural hegemony, 
analyses the production and consumption of mass communication from the perspective 
of power relations. For Hall, mass medium should be seen from the perspective of 
“encoding/decoding.”105 Encoding means that the message created by the producers 
includes already their ideology, skills, institutional knowledge and assumptions about 
the consumers; this is all formed into a “meaningful discourse.” Decoding on the other 
hand means that the message influences audience’s perceptions and beliefs and thus has 
“cognitive, emotional, ideological or behavioral consequences.”106 According to Hall, 
every culture has a specific “dominant cultural order” that constitutes the unambiguous 
and widely recognized connotative codes and “discursive domains”. These in turn 
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generate “dominant or preferred meanings” that are hierarchically organized and include 
institutional, political, ideological perception.
107
 Mass media operates on the encoding 
level with these codes and discourses, and can shape or reinforce the preferred 
meanings. Hall proposes three types of decoding: dominant-hegemonic code, means 
that audience understands the message similarly to the producers, the viewer shares the 
same views, interprets the connotative signs in similar way and agrees with the way it is 
presented. Negotiated code acknowledges the “legitimacy” of the preferred meanings, 
but sees that there can be exceptions. Oppositional code denies the preferred 
meaning.
108
 
According to Wertsch, narratives hold together collective remembering, they 
follow particular developments in society and reflect the old traditions as well as 
accommodate to new circumstances
 109
 Narratives help to remember, because of its 
causal connections and structured composition. Narratology sees that the meaning lies 
in the structure of the text, both form and content are thus important. Narrative analysis 
deals with explaining how the different elements, such as plot and fable, narrator, 
addressee, characters, actions and settings, together contribute to the meaning 
making.
110
  
Discourse analysis sees in turn that language is structured in discursive patterns. 
Norman Fairclough, the conceptualizer or critical discourse analysis, says that discourse 
indicates that language use is interconnected with everything that surrounds people. He 
states that texts have “causal effects,” they can change society and identity by forming 
new knowledge, beliefs, values and attitudes. Fairclough brings out that texts cause 
ideological effects that in turn “contribute to establishing, maintaining and changing 
social relations of power, domination and exploitation.”111 
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Methodology 
 
This thesis aims to explain how the 2013 film Stalingrad reinforces patriotism in 
Russia. The analysis will be therefore concerned with the ways how the film influences 
the perception of the war in cultural memory. It is similarly important to find out how 
the previous cultural context has influenced the portrayal of war, or what kind of 
discursive domains are present, for understanding the meaning that is communicated. 
Furthermore, the way how portrayal of the war is connected with present patriotism will 
be under observation, thus establishing its connection with cultural memory. Since the 
thesis will not only concentrate on the film as a work of art, but also as a cultural and 
social product that influences the society on different levels, study will employ the 
method of discourse analysis in the discussion. 
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a theoretical and methodological approach 
to study discourse in relation to social and cultural changes in society. There are 
different “movements” inside CDA that vary depending on the research object and 
methodology, however, they all share the notion that discursive practices are 
contributing to the organization of the social relations and identities.
 112
 All of these 
approaches also see “discourse” as an abstract term that “is an analytical category 
describing the vast array of meaning-making resources available to us,” the text under 
these conditions is seen as everything that can convey meaning – words, images, sounds 
and design.
113
 According to van Dijk, who covers such areas as mass communication, 
nationalism and identity within CDA, films can be similarly analyzed in the framework 
of CDA, because media is an influential tool in shaping the society.
114
  
Since CDA focuses on power relation, one has to see the place film occupies in 
society’s meaning-making process. Van Dijk explains that power is the control over 
group’s actions and perceptions. There are different types of power, but mass medium 
as well as art have the ability to control society, due to their authority, knowledge, or 
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information. Usually there are dominant groups in society who control other groups, by 
prescribing the discourses that are in accordance with their needs, as well as with their 
ideology.
115
 Thus, we can look at film as a product created by smaller dominant group 
in order to influence society and communicate their ideology. Ideologies, as van Dijk 
defines it are “general systems of basic ideas shared by the members of social group, 
ideas that will influence their interpretation of social events and situation and control 
their discourse and other social practices as group members.”116 Patriotism can be seen 
as ideology that influences the perception of past and present events, their attitude to 
their country’s history. However, one has to also acknowledge that the Second World 
War occupies a very important position in Russian cultural memory: Russian master 
narratives include the war as one of the crucial events for the nation, and society has 
received through years the heroic portrayal of the war. Blockbuster film must then be 
seen also as a product that follows the conventional representation and conforms to 
“dominant cultural order” in order to be popular. Stuart Hall asserts that this can also be 
seen as domination over meaning.
117
 Therefore, analyzing film in the context of power, 
one has to see that the domination is both top-down as well as bottom-up process, but in 
any case, the hegemony over meaning and representation stays. In order to analyze 
Stalingrad as a medium of cultural memory, the CDA is appropriate approach, because 
it allows seeing text in the socio-political context. Furthermore, CDA engages other 
disciplines, which is important especially in the case of film, allowing us to integrate 
iconographic, narrative and intertextual analysis. As CDA methodology is described 
rather heuristic, the film analysis thus incorporates many descriptions and author’s 
interpretations.
118
  
We now continue with explaining research design. First, we begin with short 
introduction to film. Since it is important for CDA to establish the actors of the 
communicative event, we briefly explain the production and reception. The opinion 
polls and box office numbers will be included to illustrate the popularity of the film. 
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The circumstances of the release are integrated to show the framing of the film in the 
overall social context.  
The second part of the analysis will analyze the film narrative in order to explain 
its structure. The relevant components for the cultural memory will be elaborated, such 
as the plot, narrative voice, location, action and characters.  
The third part will examine the choices made in incorporating music. Since 
music helps to remember the narratives by engaging people emotionally this part tries to 
outline the techniques used.  
The forth part will bring out the main narrative templates that are present in the 
film: “holy war,” “war to save motherland,” “war to save Russian civilization” and 
“battle for death.” These narrative templates are partly motivated by Youngblood and 
Carleton observations about war narratives in Russia. In addition to these four, the 
foreign influences on war narratives will be analyzed.  
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CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CULTURAL 
MEMORY AND FILM IN RUSSIA 
 
This part will be divided into two sections. The first will elaborate the role of film as the 
medium for creating national identity and how it has been used by the state. The second 
section is dedicated to the developments in the portrayal of war in Soviet era and 
Russian Federation. 
Film, Memory, Identity and Patriotism in the Soviet Union and Russia 
 
Mass media as a tool in the modern nation-building process has played an important 
role in Russia. David Brandenberger states that although national identity was promoted 
in Western Europe via education and media already in the nineteenth century, the same 
process occurred much later in Russia. According to Brandenberger, before the 1920s 
the vast population of Russia had identities that were on the regional level and people 
didn’t see themselves as part of a larger entity. In his opinion the nation-building 
process started together with the revolution and corresponded to the emergence of 
films.
119
 Sturken and Cartwright support this view and add that during the revolution 
filmmakers understood the power of visual media and used it in order to build “a new 
Soviet consciousness among illiterate Russian proletarians and peasants.”120 Although 
Buganov does not agree with the abovementioned timeframes, and considers that 
national identity advanced together with the reforms in 1860s, he still acknowledges 
that it was through due to the spread of literacy.
121
 In either case, the access to visual 
medium and to state propaganda increased the number of people who started to identify 
themselves as part of a bigger community. 
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Similarly, the authorities were well aware of the effects of film and its role in 
distributing the Marxism-Leninism ideology.
122
 Richard Taylor sees Soviet cinema as a 
“weapon” of state propaganda and states that both Lenin and Stalin acknowledged the 
power it had for “mass agitation.” The reason why Soviet Russia used cinema as a main 
propaganda tool was because of its emotional rather than intellectual influences on the 
audience. In Taylor’s opinion, it was more accessible for people and easily 
understandable. Cinema, being a “marvel” or “novelty” in the early Soviet times, also 
brought together people from different classes, social groups, and regions and was 
therefore used for unifying a nation and fostering patriotism. 
123
 For example, 
Youngblood mentions that during the Civil War, footage from the front and “agit-films” 
with political messages about enemies and allies were not only brought to wider 
audiences by “agit trains”, but they also had personnel who would explain the films.124 
Soviet mass media, especially films, were deeply tied to the agendas of political 
actors. The films were used as a tool to transfer the official narratives to people, which 
embraced, among other things, identity, memory and history. As Wertsch states, the 
Soviet Union tried to have very strict control over people’s memory; alternative 
accounts were criticized and only the state’s version of the past was allowed. Although 
state control had different forms throughout its existence, it was undoubtedly effective. 
Wertsch draws from the works of Heller and Nekrich in order to illustrate his point of 
view: history and memory were “nationalized” to deprive people of their individual 
memory.
125
 Thus memory and history became similarly a property of the state, since the 
state controlled not only cultural memory, but also personal memories. 
Different times needed different narratives and historical events in order to 
accommodate state interest and transfer them to people. With the building of a new state 
that was based on Marxism-Leninism, the authorities saw that it was necessary to unify 
people on the basis on the new ideology and to distance society from the old tsarist past. 
History was used to legitimize the state, and since history “proved” that the society was 
moving towards the socialist ideals, most of the narratives featured this notion. The 
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complicated Marxist-Leninist ideology, however, was difficult to grasp for the 
masses.
126
 Brandenberger points out that in the late 1920s and early 1930s, Stalin 
understood that Marxism-Leninism alone could not mobilize society and began to select 
different symbols and figures from the Russian past in order to legitimize the state and 
to foster the sense of motherland and patriotism among the people. In his view, this laid 
the grounds for the contemporary Russian identity.
127
 This time also contributed to the 
development of particular patterns in Soviet master narratives that are, according to 
Wertsch, employed also by the current Russian authorities.
128
 
The overall stress on one version of the past or preoccupation with history and 
its “accuracy” that one can see nowadays started precisely at the same time. Wertsch 
explains that “Marxist-Leninist history” was labeled as the one and only true 
interpretation of the past. However, he also says that this official history did change 
during the course of time, particularly in its treatment of the achievements of certain 
people or their role in the events, and it was an individual’s task was to keep track with 
this “truth” or otherwise he or she would become an enemy of the state.129 From the 
1930s the production of Soviet history was grounded squarely in the assumption that 
one immutable truth about the past existed. With each new version of history produced 
by the Soviet state, old ones had to be altered, discarded, and in many cases actively 
suppressed. The guiding principle might be termed “dogmatic, but temporary, truth” 
about the past.
130
 
The essence of patriotism in the Soviet Union was similarly floating depending 
on the time. Dobrenko explains that after the end of the war, new enemies were 
necessary to create in order to ensure the continuation of the state. From this point on 
the former Allies were seen as incarnation of evil. Patriotism, as the main tool in this 
process, was thus the opposition towards all the external influences. The concept of 
patriotism itself was explained as love “for soviet, socialist motherland,” “for the social 
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and governmental order” that is freed from exploitation.131 Dobrenko also adds that the 
Soviet patriotism stressed the superiority of the country, and saw Russians as pioneers 
in every cultural field of humankind.
 132
 
There are clear parallels between the current Russian state and the Soviet Union. 
One can understand that in contemporary Russia, as it was in the Soviet Union, 
particular events are used as “foundation myths” of the state. As mentioned above, 
Stalin “hand-picked” figures or events from the tsarist era to show the continuation of 
the state. According to Laruelle, Russian authorities similarly promote tsarist and Soviet 
past, by combining the greatest achievements of both entities at the same time trying to 
diminish the contradictions.
133
 History, thus serves authorities, in reasserting the 
patriotic feelings. However, Laruelle also states that patriotism in Russia is actually 
“nationalist” in nature that is constantly present in the political rhetoric and is used by 
all the political parties. Laruelle brings out the references by the politicians that can 
illustrate the main aspects of current patriotism: Russia as “Great Power,” “statehood,” 
“the preservation of the nation,” “empire,” “motherland,” or “fatherland.” Due to the 
use of “patriotism” by different political parties, it can be based on pre-Christian past, 
pre-Soviet Russian empire, the Soviet era or Orthodoxy. Similarly to Russian 
nationalism, patriotism can have a “racist” character, because it accentuates on the 
supremacy of the Russian ethnicity.
 134
  
To explain what functions patriotism plays for the current authorities, Laruelle 
asserts, that it is used for the political goals: to gain back respect for the army, to get 
more taxpayers, to diminish corruption, to contribute to the consumption of national 
products, etc. Patriotism, according to her, is actually used for “modernizing” and 
“Westernizing” country. In addition it stabilizes the society and pursues authorities’ 
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goals in reasserting their conservative politics.
135
 All in all the use of patriotic rhetoric 
by the authorities serves mobilize society for re-building a “Great Russia136  
One of the key events that is used by current authorities to foster patriotism is 
seen the Second World War, that both legitimizes state’s existence and reassures its 
“Great Power” image.137 Laruelle explains that Putin’s administration “rehabilitated” 
Stalin in the history textbooks; furthermore, media is used to disseminate patriotic 
discourse, to strengthen the “national pride” and positive self image. Among other 
mediums, cinema as well as internet is in Laruelle’s opinion under the authorities’ 
control.
138
 
Derived from Laruelle’s notion, let us now examine the concrete ways cinema 
and mass media is controlled. In year 2009 the Presidential Commission was created to 
protect the present official interpretation of the past or to counter its “falsification”.139 
The commission analyzed the information about falsification of historical facts and 
events that appeared to diminish Russian international prestige, and as a result 
developed a set of recommendations for the government.
140
 During the roundtable of 
November 19, 2012 the Council of the Federation came to a conclusion that 
preservation of Russia’s historical heritage as one of the most important components of 
“spiritual-cultural” heritage and its protection from falsification is necessary for 
strengthening the identity, state, unity of citizens, patriotism and national security. Here, 
Russia is described as a great multinational state, which enriched the world with its 
science and culture, and played a decisive role in saving the world from the fascist 
threat. In order to preserve Russia’s historical heritage, the Council recommended that 
Government should, among other things, develop measures to stimulate the production 
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and distribution of TV and radio programs as well as internet resources that would raise 
awareness and popularize this version of history. The Ministry of Educations received a 
recommendation to increase the time dedicated for historical events in schools that are 
central to form national consciousness, including the Second World War.
141
 Hence, the 
importance of the Second World War has been acknowledged by the authorities as a 
tool in creation of unifying identity. The war here represents the key event for the 
Russian patriotism, since it stresses both victimization and heroism: it unites people on 
the basis of the common suffering and victory over the enemy. Pluralistic and 
alternative views on the event can therefore undermine the legitimacy of the USSR and 
its Russian successor state, since it questions the sacrifices brought by the nation.  
The fixation with “true” and “false” interpretation has lead to the place where 
large parts of public opinion and authorities are not willing to tolerate artistic freedom 
or freedom of expression. On April 4, 2014 the Russian Duma adopted legislation that 
punishes the rehabilitation of Nazism and the “distortion” of history that is connected 
with the Red Army’s actions during the Second World War. According to the law, both 
individuals and mass media could be punished for distributing “false” information. 
Besides filmmakers and artists, this law will also affect historians who wish to study 
different versions and aspects of the war. Although the members of the Duma started to 
work on the law already in 2009, the work intensified and finished due to the scandal 
around the TV channel “Rain” (“Дождь”). “Rain” asked its viewers if it was necessary 
to give up Leningrad to the Germans in order to save hundreds of thousands of 
people.
142
 The question was seen as an insult to the memory of the Second World War, 
and authorities wished to close down the station. Since there was no law that could 
forbid these kinds of activities, the channel was not closed down; however, many 
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sponsors withdrew their money and “Rain” had some severe financial problems for a 
while.
143
 One can thus understand that filmmakers in future do not have a possibility to 
portray the Second World War other then heroic, because one cannot show Red Army’s, 
or Stalin’s flaws. The war in movies has to follow the line of “Russians are good” and 
“Germans are bad,” thus limiting the discourse to simple confrontation. In this way the 
discourse of war will be synchronized in some sense, and the lack the contradictions 
will not confuse audience. Thus, constantly disseminating a similar discourse would 
eventually unify the cultural memory.  
One of the initiators of the abovementioned law and participants of the 
Presidential Commission was Vladimir Medinsky, appointed as the Minister of Culture 
in May 2012. Besides being a politician, Medinski has also written a series of books 
about the Soviet/Russian myths. In his writings he argues against the pluralist 
approaches to Russian history that began with glasnost. Medinsky considers films as an 
important medium for communicating past events. For example, in the book The War. 
USSR’s Myths. 1939-45 (2011) he dedicated one part to Russian and Western films 
about the Second World War. Among other foreign films, he pointed out the flaws in 
the representation of history from films like Saving Private Ryan, Inglorious Bastards 
and Pearl Harbor. Medinsky’s biggest critique of these seems to be the 
misrepresentation or absence of the Soviet Union’s contribution to the war effort. He 
also either criticizes or praises Russian and Soviet films, and one can see that the 
author’s goal is to “set the record straight.” He further stresses the connection between 
his work and the state’s views on the Second World War cinema by adding three of 
Putin’s favorite films under the section “Cinema for Putin.”144 This is a significant 
example how the authorities are fixated with the ‘true” representation of past, but it also 
illustrates that they understand the significant role that cinema plays in mediating 
history. 
The acts the government and the Duma have taken to limit “false” and to 
encourage “politically correct” representation illustrate the place that the Second World 
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occupies in achieving their political goals. The promotion and sponsorship of the war 
movies have resulted in a growing number of films, both documentary and fiction on 
the topic.
 145
 The event is an example of Russia as a “Great Power” and coincides with 
most of the above mentioned aspects of patriotism. The war stresses that people 
sacrificed themselves for their motherland, for their state, for their nation, the victory on 
the other hand reassures people of their strength and of their positive self image. 
However, the present patriotism also stresses tsarist past and Orthodox religion, and 
although they may not be compatible with the Soviet era achievement, this work is 
partly dedicated to illustrate, how the religion is integrated to the war memory and thus 
becomes a bridge between two different pasts. 
 
Second World War Memory in Soviet and Russian films 
 
The portrayal of the Second World War on screen has gone through different 
developments that reflected the consciousness of the Soviet society and at the same time 
changed it.
146
 The transformations in remembering the war coincide with Aleida 
Assmanns notion of the generational shift. According to her, the change of generations 
is pre-eminent for “renewal and reconstruction of social memory.”147 Similarly, in the 
Soviet Union and in the Russian Federation, the Second World War was reviewed by 
every succeeding generation who explains the war experience from their own 
standpoint, based on their values and the current situation.  
According to Shpagin, during the war and its horrors people felt closer to God 
and to existential questions. The war offered people a real enemy, not the “invented” 
enemy of the 1930s.
148
 The war always played a significant role for the state and for the 
nation. One can see that the tragedy brought people together in commemoration and 
                                                          
145
 Youngblood, Russian War Films, 219, 231. 
146
 Youngblood, Russian War Films., 1; Александр Шпагин, Великая Отечественная Война  В 
Российском Кинематографе (In English: The Great Patriotic War in Russian Cinematography) 
(Телеканал “Дождь,” 2012), 
http://tvrain.ru/articles/aleksandr_shpagin_velikaya_otechestvennaya_voyna_v_rossiyskom_kinematograf
e-243935/. 
147
 Emden and Midgley, Cultural Memory and Historical Consciousness, 23. 
148
 Шпагин, Великая Отечественная Война  В Российском Кинематографе. 
 
 
35 
 
gave them a reason to be proud of their country. It strengthened a shared patriotism, not 
on the basis of ideology, but instead on the basis of wartime sacrifice, suffering, and 
victory. This part of my thesis addresses the phases that shaped the narrative of the war 
during the Soviet and post-Soviet eras and how they were reflected in films. It is also 
important to examine common themes between the two eras that have retained 
relevance and why these themes remain so significant nowadays.  
The Second World War exists in modern Russian culture in the form of “myth,” 
in the creation and sustaining of which the filmmakers played and are still playing an 
important role.
149
 Talaver explains that the war can be described as both a “grounding 
myth” and a “defensive myth”, since it also laid the ground for the new nation and 
mobilized whole society to defend its country.
150
 The “myth” is here seen as a story that 
transfers values particularly important for the nation. Russian cinema critic and 
historian Shpagin calls the war also a “religion”; he states that during the Soviet time, 
the Second World War was a temple and a substitute for God.
151
  
Similarly, Youngblood sees war as a significant theme in both Soviet and 
Russian films. War themes proved to be very popular and had large audiences, which 
also suggests that they had strong influence on society. She offers several reasons why 
war had an important place in the Soviet cinema: the USSR was founded during the 
civil war, war helped to maintain the authoritarian rule by showing that the state is 
surrounded by enemies, the state rhetoric was by nature militaristic, and war films 
offered an opportunity to implant the official history through entertainment. She also 
explains that war became a way of life and worked as an “organizing principle” for the 
state. In Youngblood’s opinion, “the war movie could never be “only” a movie” during 
the Soviet era, since the film industry was under state control. But Youngblood also 
acknowledges that films have the power of both “reinforcing and undermining” the 
official history, given the complexity of the film as art, as well as state’s policy to ban 
certain films. Accordingly, “complicated cultural products” are much harder to contain 
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under censorship. Not all political films were propaganda and many filmmakers planted 
in them images that were “complex and ambiguous.”152 
Still, what made war-films popular among both the producers and people was 
that war stories are easily told with the help of the classical narrative structure which 
makes them easily to comprehend. As Youngblood explains, the story is “character-
centered and action-oriented” and “the plot consists of three parts: the status quo 
(peacetime) is established; it is then violated (invasion); and finally, set right (victory).” 
A linear narrative with minimal “flashbacks” or “crosscuttings” and the realistic style 
makes the story also easier to follow. Youngblood draws out two main story lines in the 
Soviet war movie: the “mission” (the collective goal) and the “personal” (individual 
leaders or comrades) and stresses that in contrast to the “American-style happy ending”, 
the Soviet “happiness” meant that heroes usually died and became martyrs.153  
Cathrine Merridale asserts that the post-Second World War canons as well as the 
“myth” were actually founded before the war began. The war movies in the 1930s not 
only motivated soldiers to fight, but also influenced the personal memories of the 
soldiers after the war was over. The heroic films that were shown created figures that 
soldiers could relate to during the war, and as veterans they wanted to resemble the 
fictional heroes they saw in the films.
 
Both Merridale and Talaver acknowledge the 
importance of portrayals of the war with Germany prior to 1941, since it made it easier 
to fight the enemies that people were already aware of and to strengthen the anti-fascist 
narrative.154 
If during the 1930s war was portrayed as a “bloodless war” (война малой 
кровью), then the actual war brought “suffering, tears, fear, humiliation, losses” to the 
screens.
155
 Carleton, analyzing the Soviet and Russian war films from the perspective of 
annihilation narratives, states that the image of total destruction, which is very 
characteristic for almost all war movies, can be dated back to the Second World War. In 
his opinion, the main war narratives before the war also represented “ultimate sacrifice” 
and “supreme opportunity to die for the country,” but the actual war that generated 
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enormous human losses changed the war experience to one of “total annihilation.” The 
war “shattered traditional paradigms for troping the dead and has made it the backdrop 
to any and all contemporary discussions of war and death in Russian culture.
”156 
  
Shpagin agrees with Carleton, and says that the sacrifice for the motherland was 
indeed the main goal for people. He says there was no regular death, only death with a 
“capital letter,” which means to die for one’s country. The war distinguished good 
people from bad. It was the ultimate test for people, and brought out their true nature.
157
 
The distinction between good and bad is on the other hand a simplified understanding of 
a patriot and an enemy, since it is brought to a viewer the context of fighting or 
surrendering to the invader. 
Shpagin also sees that the war experience brought people closer to God, 
although they did not know what God was; they still felt it intuitively and 
unconsciously. During the war, there appeared an “existential beginning” in the films 
that was in direct conflict with state ideology. It made people ask existential questions, 
and these questions are all directed to God. Many war films can therefore be 
characterized as a “procession” (Крестный поход), steps that people need to take to get 
to God. There might not even be religious images or symbols, or the symbols are turned 
upside down, but one can still feel the influences of Christianity in death and sacrifice. 
The Soviet “myth” of the war was therefore one of tragedy, but also purification. These 
religious connotations were also used afterwards. For instance, Shpagin notes that in the 
film of Sergey Bondarchuk ,They Fought for Their Country (1975), the main character 
crosses himself and asks God why was he being punished this way.
158
  
Youngblood agrees with Shpagin, and considers the war-time films very 
significant for overall Soviet cinema, especially since there was greater artistic freedom 
in the production of these films. She states that one of the most important films at that 
time was a documentary: The Defeat of the German Fascist Troops near Moscow 
(1942). According to Youngblood, the film brought out four major themes that were 
products of Russian culture, but also influenced strongly future narratives: (1) “holy war 
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to save the motherland” (2) “people’s war” (3) “a battle to the death” and (4) “a war to 
save Russian civilization.” At the same time Stalin defined the war as a Russian 
endeavor, in order to mobilize the larger part of the population and therefore one can see 
the influences of this essentially political decision in the wartime films. These themes 
support Youngblood’s understanding that “Soviet cinema was “Great Russian” in its 
orientation.”159 
Wartime also contributed images of women as heroes or warriors to Russian 
cinema. Although, the image didn’t last long on the screen, it still influenced films in 
later periods. The portrayal of women in the films goes hand in hand with the need to 
mobilize women and incorporate them into defense of the state. The symbols, however, 
seem to be important, since the Russian word “motherland” (rodina) started to replace 
the world more commonly used in Soviet context, “fatherland” (otechestvo). The state is 
therefore associated once again with Russianness and the religious tradition of Christian 
motherhood.
160
  
In the last year of the war, Stalin strengthened censorship. Women did not 
receive much attention any more; instead the Red Army assumed a central position.
161
 
The state started to dictate how the war should be portrayed to the smallest details. For 
instance, in her work about the Second World War memory in Russian films, Alexandra 
Talaver brings out the official directive from 22.10.1943 that prescribed how to present 
war in films. First, it was essential to speak about the loss of lives, but it also prescribed 
details, such as: soldiers' equipment in winter conditions, attrition in the process of 
continuous battles, the hardships of digging the trenches, carrying the weapons in 
difficult places (forests, swamps), the difficult work of nurses and doctors, etc.
162
 It 
therefore shows, that artistic freedom was quite strongly regulated in the most minute 
details. 
From this point on the films portrayed, to a greater of lesser degree, political 
changes within the Soviet state. During the last years of the war one can already notice 
some particular developments in the war narrative directed to people through films. 
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Yougblood underscores that there was a place also for the current concerns of society, 
for instance, how to welcome home injured veterans.
163
 The films aimed to lift the 
morale of people or instructed them how to deal with the consequences of the war. 
The narratives that were created after the war lasted until the death of Stalin. In 
this immediate postwar narrative the achievements of wartime were ascribed mainly to 
Stalin and the victory of the war was closely connected with the cult of Stalin.
164
 
Similarly, the first films of that era stressed that the war was won by the generals who 
were guided by the “wise Comrade Stalin.” After a while, the generals were set aside 
and the accomplishment was Stalin’s alone. According to Youngblood, there were 
usually two types of heroes: dead people and Stalin.
. 
Thus, the films from this time may 
have influenced the overall emphasis on death, as the true heroes of the war usually fall 
on the battleground. There was also an emphasis on ultimate victory, as individual 
suffering was marginalized.
165
  
The The Fall of Berlin (1949) is, according to researchers, one of the 
characteristic films of that era portraying Stalin as a wise “teacher” and “advisor” to the 
generals.
166
 According to Taylor, this film promoted the cult of Stalin and justified the 
post-war division of Europe and the developing Cold War. The Fall of Berlin also tries 
to further shape the post-war official narratives in its portrait of the Yalta Conference: 
the audience sees that Churchill was the main obstacle to a quick end to the war, 
whereas Stalin is a true statesman who tries to encourage the allies to help him achieve 
peace. Taylor states that the film is a good example of how the recent past was used in 
order to “promote a particular interpretation of the present.”167 In addition, such films 
followed the narrative taught in the schools. For example, Wertsch points out that the 
recommendations for schools from 1949 prescribed the portrayal of Stalin as the wise 
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leader who outwitted the Germans.
168
 The film therefore strengthened the master 
narrative by reinforcing it with visual elements. 
Although, Stalin’s cult disappears soon after his death, other narratives remained 
constant throughout the Soviet era. This represents once again the search for the usable 
past. Since the world order needed to be legitimized and reasons provided as to why 
previous allies became enemies, the nation had to know that the allies were actually 
hindering the peace. It also supports the interpretation that the Soviet Union was the 
major player among the allies in liberating Europe from Nazi Germany. 
After Stalin’s death, there was a break from the Second World War movies. 
According to Shpagin, the filmmakers were lost during that time and did not know how 
to portray the war.
169
 Only after Khrushchev’s Secret Speech they were able to 
understand the present position towards the war. Youngblood states that “during the de-
Stalinization, the Stalin cult was replaced by a cult of the Great Patriotic War”. The 
films featured individual sufferings, however, at the same time heroization remained. 
They also “re-examined” the previous narrative of the Great Patriotic War and 
“challenged” the sole role of Stalin in the victory. The Thaw contributed to postwar 
Soviet cinema with the world-famous Second World War films such as The Cranes are 
Flying (1957, Kalatozov), The Ballad of a Soldier (1959, Churkhrai), The Fate (or 
Destiny) of a Man (1959, S. Bondarchuk), and Ivan’s Childhood (1962, Tarkovsky). 
According to the scholarship, the films on historical themes were mainly produced by 
young directors who started their careers during the Thaw, since the older generation 
was not willing to accommodate themselves to the sudden changes in the official 
narratives.
170
  
In Brezhnev era the war films were seen as particularly important in building 
patriotism and Soviet identity. Since the Second World War “cult” also reached its peak 
during that time, it is understandable that filmmakers had to accommodate the demands 
of both the state and people, and this caused the rapid growth in war film production. 
Although the Party still denounced Stalin’s cult of personality, the officials were not 
very satisfied with the new portrayal of the Second World War during the Thaw: it did 
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not promote patriotism and confidence in the Soviet army. Similarly, the ambiguous art 
films were difficult to understand for a larger audience, who preferred “Hollywood 
style” stories that would make them “feel good about the past sacrifices”. According to 
Youngblood, the “Stagnation era” films approached the Second World War in very 
different ways. Although, Brezhnev preferred “straightforward” art and wished it to 
serve the state’s goals, some filmmakers continued the “low key questioning.” This era 
contributed large-scale combat films that almost always took place on the ground 
(Stolper’s Retribution, 1967, Ozerov’s Liberation 1968-71). A new genre was 
introduced in the form of the thriller, and Soviet spies were added to the list of heroes 
(Sasov’s Shield and Sword, 1967-68).171 The overall approach to war in the films of the 
1970s, however, did not reflect the cult of war that was taking place in the society.
 
According to Youngblood, “[F]ilmmakers peeled away the shiny surface of the “war 
cult to reveal the blood, grit, fear, and desperation that lie below.”172 These movies may 
not have had such an influence on the larger audiences, due to their poor reception since 
large scale combat movies were still more popular.
173
 They clearly carried on the Thaw 
traditions and influenced significantly the next generation of filmmakers. 
During the 1980s, the Afghan War also changed the interpretation of the Second 
World War. Youngblood asserts that many films at this time were influenced by the art 
films that came out during the Thaw. For instance, Yevtushenko’s Kindergarten 
continued the topic or forms of Ivan’s Childhood and The Ballad of a Soldier. Here, the 
vulnerability of children in war gained attention, reflecting the ongoing discussions that 
took place about the same topic in society. One can see that filmmakers approached the 
war differently; the war was now seen more and more from pluralistic perspectives, 
children and women in combat were brought to the screen, and there was also more 
room for relationships and romance.
174
 
For the fortieth anniversary of Soviet Union’s victory in the Second World War 
in 1985, one can see many contrasting approaches from the filmmakers; on the one hand 
Ozerov came out with the “Brezhnev-Stalinist” film A Battle for Moscow, (1985), on 
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the other hand, there is Mkrtchian’s Legal Marriage, (1985) that connects to the films 
from the Thaw. In the same year an antiwar film was also released – Come and See, 
(1985) by Klimov. It called for peace and showed no heroes or glory. Interestingly, it 
was very popular and was named the best film at the Moscow Film Festival. One can 
see that the development in society toward openness had already started. Youngblood 
points out that before glasnost Lev Anninsky wrote an article about the Second World 
War, stating that the war in the films is not portrayed as it was, but that it portrayed 
what was in the collective memory. The war was a “legend” and therefore filmmakers 
had to bring new paradigms to people. Anninsky also proposed that the new generation 
of filmmakers who did not have the experience of war themselves should bring in their 
own interpretation.
175
 
The Openness (glasnost) of the late 1980s continued to bring out all the topics 
that were not dealt with in earlier films. Suddenly, viewers had to deal with very 
complex topics that did not coincide with the master narratives they were fed 
throughout the post-war period. The penal battalions, negligence of the commanders, 
starving, unprepared and ill-equipped soldiers, the destiny of the POWs, prisoners as 
“suicide troops” – all found their way to the screen by the end of glasnost. The most 
intriguing in this regard was the documentary film Penal Soldiers (1990) by Lev 
Danilov that unveiled a topic kept secret for decades.
176
 According to Carleton and 
Wertsch, such topics were still difficult to process for people who were taught to respect 
the memory of the war. The open discussion about the war horrors opened up public 
debates and the directors as well as historians were accused of falsifying history.
177
 
These debates are still taking place, the revelations that started during the Gorbachev era 
continue to influence society. As Medinsky demonstrates in his book The War. The 
Myths of the USSR. 1939-45, the number of dead that Gorbachev proposed, as well as 
the role of the penal battalions in war, is once again disputed.
178
 The authorities try to 
turn back the clock and deny the mistakes that Soviet leaders made during the war, and 
as Youngblood states, the war is still a “minefield for Russian historians”.179  
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In the 1990s there was a tendency to continue with some revisionist movies 
about the Second World War, however, due to financial problems in the film industry, 
the overall production of films fell significantly and since the new regime wanted to 
distance itself from the history of the Soviet Union, the topic was not very important in 
society.
180
 Youngblood points out that the fiftieth anniversary of Victory Day was met 
with sorrow, not pride, because the truth about the Second World War was difficult to 
digest for the larger population.
181
 With taking away such a strong “myth” as the Great 
Patriotic War, people had nothing to lean on. As Wertsch states, however, the 
transformation of the “official” collective memory and the disappointing information 
about the “sacred” war were in fact working counter to what was expected among larger 
population. Since people were taught by their experience with Soviet mass media not to 
trust everything that is portrayed, many people thought that truth was actually opposite 
to what was shown.
182
 It was therefore not a surprise that the memory and the 
“sacrality” of the Great Patriotic war were once again revived successfully by the 
authorities of the next era. 
According to Wood, Putin stated that the war was “a genuine achievement of 
great power,” implying that the president wished to restore people’s respect for their 
own country.
183
 Mikhaleva, however, places Putin’s constant invoking of the past in a 
much wider perspective. She asserts that “[T]he renewed imperial ambitions of an 
“energy superpower” require legitimization, justifying claims to dominance in the post-
Soviet space and offering society release from its post-Soviet inferiority complex.”184 
Partly because of these reasons, partly because of popular demand to reinstate the war to 
its previous position, a number of Second World War films started to appear after year 
2000. The war was once again portrayed differently and the interpretations of the war 
varied substantially.
185
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Talaver sees most of the war movies in the year 2000 as commemorative, stating 
the direct connection between film and memory. The films are based on the official 
Soviet tradition of portraying the war and its interpretation in accordance with the myth 
of the Great Patriotic War. Although the commemorative films also include images that 
were introduced from the end of 1980s, such as POWs, collaborators, and penal 
battalions, they are usually used to make the story and characters more interesting. In 
August of 1944 (2001) and The Star (2002) are seen as commemorative films that 
follow Soviet canons, but also emphasize the authenticity of the events portrayed.
186
 
Youngblood adds that The Star fits well “into the national revival that the Putin 
government is trying to encourage in the face of declining patriotism and support for the 
military”.187 Furthermore, according to Norris, the film “updated the importance of the 
Great Patriotic War for Putin-era audiences.”188 
In addition, Talaver explains that during the most recent decades of Russian 
cinema the “myth” of the Great Patriotic War adds rather than excludes different 
features.
189
 Accordingly, Youngblood points to films that are innovative in regards of 
the themes they include: The Unknown Blockade (2003) reveals cannibalism and the 
plan of destroying the people by the Soviet authorities. Echelon (2006) depicts the mass 
rape of German women committed by Soviet soldiers.
190
 It is important to emphasize 
that these topics, as well as the existence of penal battalions, are now highly disputed by 
the larger population. For instance, the film A Woman in Berlin (2008) that was released 
just two years after Echelon received negative feedback from the Russian audience, 
because it “distorted the history” and presented Russians, who freed Europe from the 
Nazis, in a bad light.
191
 Moreover, in a situation where the new law to protect the 
memory of the Second World War has been introduced, these kind of alternative 
accounts will probably not be allowed. 
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The new era also added Orthodox religion and Russian nationality to the 
memory of the Second World War, which established a connection with the Russian 
imperial past.
192
 Although one can argue that these topics were also perceivable during 
the Soviet era, Shpagin notes that the motifs that one can interpret as religious are now 
even stronger.
193
 In addition, Younglood sees Soviet cinema as “Great Russian” and 
Brandenberger considers the overall Soviet identity as Russian in nature.
194 
Thus they 
are stating that the religion was never gone from the commemoration of war, even, if 
the religious images did not make it to the screens. Now, however, the features that one 
could only sense in the Soviet era films are visible and openly addressed. Talaver 
asserts that there are not only religious symbols, but that the church plays a central 
position in films like Pop (2009), where a religious leader, Father Alexandr, is 
favorably portrayed.
195
 Religious themes and symbols in contemporary films are not 
only the result of reestablishing a new Russian identity on the basis of Orthodoxy, but 
are also due to changes in the war commemoration practices during the 1990s. The 
inclusion of the Church in the commemoration of the war can be called an “invented 
tradition,” a concept proposed by Hobsbawm, who said that usually the traditions that 
people consider old, are in fact quite recent.
196
 During the Soviet era, one’s religion was 
not displayed; however, since the Church is now a very important part of the war 
commemoration, one can see that films indeed leave an impression that it was also a 
part of everyday life during the Soviet Union. Therefore, the tradition that started 
twenty years ago seems to be older than it actually is, and people themselves start to 
acquire the new memory narratives. 
The parallels with memory and film, as one can see are sound. As personal 
memories vary, depending on the individuals, so too do the films show various 
perspectives, covering not only the state’s official history, but the lives of ordinary 
people. If one also acknowledges the screenplays that may have been either inspired by 
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or drawn from personal memories, the connection is even stronger. In this regard, of 
course one can argue that all the films can be compared with memory, since memory is 
selective and reflects the present situation. Moreover, no one can claim to portray the 
authenticity of events, since they have been exposed to the cultural memory. But the 
most important thing is the emphasis on the interpretation of the younger generation, 
because it clearly shows what resonates in society.  
This thesis aims to complement the work already done in the field of Soviet and 
Russian films, by analyzing contemporary film Stalingrad (2013) in Russian cultural 
and social context. Since the film is relatively new, it has received attention only from 
film critics and has not yet placed in the larger context of Soviet and Russian war films. 
Furthermore, this thesis tries to see also how the film tries to engage the public in the 
story and thus influence the society.  
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CHAPTER THREE: CULTURAL MEMORY AND PATRIOTISM IN 
THE FILM STALINGRAD  
 
Stalingrad tells an epic story about five Russian soldiers and a girl named Katya who all 
protect a house in Stalingrad. They live in the strategically important house and time to 
time fight with Germans. There is also another trajectory in the film that shows the 
relationship between German captain Kahn and Russian woman Masha. This is 
concentrated around the “forbidden” love story and on inability of Germans to conquer 
the house Russians live.  
This part of the thesis is dedicated to the film analysis from the point of view of 
cultural memory and the ways how the representation in film influences the 
understanding of the war in society and fostering patriotism. 
Background information  
 
Stalingrad was directed by Fedor Bondarchuk, its screenplay written by Ilya Tilkin and 
Sergey Snezhkin based on Vassili Grossman’s novel “Life and Fate.” The film was 
released in September 2013 in Volgograd (previously Stalingrad). It is one of the best-
selling feature films, not only due to the topic, but also because of its new technological 
approach: it is the first 3D movie made in Russia. One can say that from the perspective 
of cultural memory, the place where the film was released as well as the year is 
significant. This film has the ambition to influence audience, since it is framed by all 
other festivities connected with the celebration of 70
th
 anniversary of great victories like 
battles of Stalingrad and Kursk. Moreover, the film was released in the place where the 
battle actually took place, thus the connection between film and real life is strengthened. 
Similarly, it was conscious choice to have the TV premier on the most important date 
connected with the Second World War for Russians, Victory Day on May 9.
197
 In many 
ways it resembles the Soviet tradition to make the Second World War anniversary films 
(for example Ozerov’s films). The film thus serves as the “trigger” for the cultural 
                                                          
197
 “9 Мая Состоится Телепремьера Фильма Федора Бондарчука ‘Сталинград’ (In English The 
Premier of Fyodor Bondarchuk’s Film ‘Stalingrad’ on TV Will Take Place on May 9),” Российская 
Газета, accessed October 4, 2014, http://www.rg.ru/2014/05/08/stalingrad.html. 
 
 
48 
 
memory and one of the ways to commemorate the event, by pointing out that this was a 
turning point for nation’s history. Looking at this in the context of contemporary 
political developments that strives to promote the Second World War for fostering 
patriotic feelings, as well as to censor the negative portrayal of the war, and 
acknowledging that the film was supported by the Russian Ministry of Culture, this may 
also be seen as one of the ways to communicate the “politically correct” interpretation 
of the event.
 198
 As one can see, Russian cinema critics have also pointed this out, seeing 
the film as “the peak of Russian patriotic absurd,” “implementation of the social order,” 
the need to show the “heroic acts,” the portrayal of “true history,” etc.199  
The way how audience is attracted to the cinema is through the use of new 
technology. This is the first Russian 3D film, the most expensive film in the Russian 
history, and since it was supported by the government, one can see that the use of new 
technology for communicating historical event is considered important both by the state 
and by the producers.
200
 Their effort was effective, since Stalingrad became also the 
highest-grossing film in the history of Russia; there were over 6 million viewers who all 
shared the same story of the battle of Stalingrad in 3D format.
201
 The number of 2D film 
viewers, who either did not have enough resources or time to go to cinema, increases 
the total number probably by millions, but this is impossible to estimate since the film is 
freely available on multiple websites. One can say, however, that the film itself became 
an important event in the cinema history: different polls show that it was seen as the 
best film of the year by the audience.
202
 When a historical theme based film becomes a 
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blockbuster, one has to acknowledge that it has an effect on the groups perception of 
history as well as on the ideology the film communicates. Furthermore, its influences 
are even stronger when the story shown does not portray the event in a conflicting way, 
but transfers a conventional interpretation. Thus, using Stuart Hall’s terminology, the 
reception proves that the film is decoded in the dominant-hegemonic code, because it 
uses widely accepted connotative codes for portrayal of the Second World War.  
Since individual memory cannot be separated from cultural memory, the 
personal experience and connections to the war and previous war films of the Director 
Fyodor Bondarchuk seem similarly important, since they show the views of the member 
of this cultural context. We can see that the director has a personal involvement with the 
war: his father Sergey Bondarchuk, the famous Soviet film director, was an actual 
participant in the war. In addition, Fyodor Bondarchuk was a student of Ozerov, who 
made three great films about the Second World War, all for the great anniversaries, 
among others Stalingrad (1990), in which young Bondarchuk played a leading role.  
Fyodor Bondarchuk himself has directed a film about the Afghan War, 9
th
 
Company (2005) that was seen also as a patriotic film and became very popular in 
Russia.
203
 However, one can say that the previous film was still more critical about 
army and thus it is not well integrated to the narrative of Russia as “the Great Power.” 
One of the screenwriters, Sergey Snezhkin, has directed previously TV series The White 
Guard (2012) that generated controversies in Ukraine and was banned there and the 
director was accused of transforming Bulgakov’s novel into anti-Ukrainian.204 On the 
example of this, one can see that the controversies surrounding The Civil War, where 
Red and White Russians where fighting each other, are softened by portraying 
Ukrainians, who fought for their freedom, as the worst enemy. Although, one cannot 
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make many assumptions based on few previous films, the producers still seem to follow 
the line of the state ideology by communicating heroic as well as nationalist discourses. 
 Although Stalingrad is created on the motifs of novel “Life and Fate” by Vassili 
Grossman, there few things that could lead us back to the novel. One can say that one of 
the characters, Katya, is taken partially from the book, as well as the location of the 
main action, the house.
205
 “Life and Fate” is a complicated thaw-era novel that speaks 
mainly about how people’s lives were influenced by war, looking at civilians, their 
family life, thus there is not particular emphasis on heroism. The novel was banned in 
the Soviet Union also because of the negative portrayal of Stalin. It was first published 
in Soviet Union only in 1988, however, even then the last chapter about the antisemitic 
policies of the USSR was excluded.
206
One year before Stalingrad (2013) was released 
there was screening of a TV serial Life and Fate (2012) that was close to Grossman’s 
original novel. One can only assume was this screening of an novel an inspiration for 
Bondarchuk, or a way to rewrite the story of victimization to a heroic narrative.  
 Based on this background information, one can say that there are ways that the 
production has the ambition to influence the society, with the choice of new technology, 
with releasing it in the city that was previously carrying a name Stalingrad. The 
director, who is already famous for its patriotic film is a good addition to bring people 
to the cinema. Furthermore, those people, influenced by Grossman’s controversial novel 
could see a new interpretation of it that coincides with the current political viewpoint on 
the Stalingrad battle.  
 
Narrative Analysis of Film 
 
This analysis concentrates on the main elements that can be related to the aspects of the 
influence of the narrative structure on the reception of cultural memory in film. Thus it 
does not try to analyze all of the components. The structure and the choices made are 
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analyzed also in the framework of the cultural memory theory and involve many 
descriptions in order to illustrate the analysis. 
 Stalingrad is a full length feature film that is considered as a thriller; however, it 
also incorporates many static scenes and conversations. The plot is not linear: film starts 
with present Japan and then takes audience back to Stalingrad in autumn 1943, the film 
end again with present day. Talaver asserts that films which have the ambition to 
influence collective memory try to establish some kind of connection between the past 
and the present, the films may be retrospective (memories), take people back in time 
(time travelling), or show some kind of biological or social connection between people 
in the present and in the past (relatives, graduate of the same school).
207
 Similarly, 
Stalingrad’s plot begins in contemporary Japan, where a Russian rescuer Sergey tries to 
save German youth from a building that has collapsed as a result of an earthquake. In 
order to keep them calm he starts to speak about his five fathers that were killed during 
the Stalingrad battle, from this point he becomes a narrator of the war story. It is 
important to note that he speaks not about his own memories, but the stories his mother 
told him. So from one point one can see the story as a claim to the authentic 
representation of his mother’s life. On the other hand, it can be seen as a tale or a fiction 
that is invented by him on the spot, especially when he speaks about the situations, his 
mother was not involved with. The direct biological connection with the participants 
also strengthens ties with the collective memory, stating that the rescuer belongs to the 
same group and shares the same collective memories. His mother’s memories are his 
memories, although he did not have the same experience. Similarly, contemporary 
Russians have memories of the Second World War without participating in it. Due to 
the scale of the Second World War, almost everyone knows someone in Russia, who 
lost their relatives in the Second World War, and many people have heard war 
memories from the primary source. The film Stalingrad accentuates this phenomenon 
by telling the stories of all positive characters (Katya and Russian soldiers).  
 Although, Sergey is a narrator of the war story, he is a “point of view” of the 
film, since he is also one of the characters. Thus one can see him expresses also his 
opinion about the importance of the war. Time to time his voice appears in the war 
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story, telling mostly about the life experience of the Russian soldiers and Katya. As 
already established in the first part of the thesis, the emotions are considered to 
influence the remembering of the story, of the events portrayed, as well as bring 
relevance into memory. Sergey’s intrusion to the war story thus plays on viewers 
emotions, because he explains the reasons how one or another participant became who 
they were. For instance, he accentuates on the soldiers’ previous suffering: how they 
lost their relatives, how they became cruel, etc. He is thus eliciting sympathy towards 
these characters. In the end, the story-teller also explains how important this event is for 
the whole nation. He also points out that his mother wanted him to remember to whom 
he owes his life. This is stressing on the fact that the whole nation should remember the 
event, thus directly accentuating that the film is one way to commemorate it.  
 Let us now turn to the main characters. The war story is divided to two main 
story-lines: about Russian soldiers and Katya (Russian patriots, i.e. “us”) and about 
German captain Kahn and Masha (enemies and traitors, i.e. “them”). This coincides 
with classical Hollywood narrative elaborated by Elsaesser and Buck and is easy to 
comprehend for larger audiences.
208
 Respectively, each trajectory is engaging due to 
love stories. However, these love stories are different: Katya and five soldiers’ love can 
be seen as self-sacrificing love agape, whereas Masha and Kahn are portraying erotic 
love. One cannot actually see the evolution of these characters during the whole film, it 
seems like they all possessed their set of values before the battle started.  
 Katya is the main female character. She lives in the house that is crucial for 
protecting the frontline. When soldiers enter her house, she refuses to leave and mostly 
all the film from this moment on, will be concentrated on protecting her and the house. 
Katya is attributed with numerous saint-like features. Especially important seems to be 
her name, which is stressed with the slow motion by repeating the moment many times, 
in order to show the reaction of each soldier to her name (29:05 min). Katya is a 
diminutive of Ekaterina (Catherine in English), which means “pure.” Her character and 
manners are all supporting the name.
209
 She represents the character that has no flaws, 
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an ideal woman who takes care of the soldiers by bringing them water. Her character 
coincides with patriarchic model of a “good woman” that has Virgin Mary as a role 
model, thus “pious, loving, humble, hardworking, sweet and obedient.”210 The fact that 
she becomes mother without implied physical connection to anyone, one could see that 
the resemblance with Virgin Mary is even stronger. Thus, she becomes mother of all 
Christians, and in this particular film mother of all Russians or “motherland.” This on 
the other hand is strengthened in the cultural memory by the association to the 
Stalingrad’s symbol – “The Motherland Calls,” monument to the fallen in the Second 
World War. 
 Together with Katya there are five soldiers from different places in Russia: 
captain Gromov, Astakhov, Chvanov, Polyakov and Nikiforov. These are the soldiers 
audience gets to know and who will be all sharing their life stories with Katya during 
the battle. Here, these individual retrospective stories of suffering make the whole film 
seem more authentic, since the stories resemble the narratives that have been passed 
mouth to mouth. Personal memories make an audience bond with the story-teller and 
characters, and eventually the film has the potential to rewrite or change the stories that 
people have heard before. 
 There are signs in the beginning that the “love triangle” appears in the relations 
between Katya and five soldiers, that men will start competing with each other for her, 
however, the intrigue is left out. One can interpret the love men have for Katya is 
actually love for motherland, because they are all working together to keep her alive, 
and sacrifice themselves for her. There is no particular rivalry between men, and Katya 
loves every one of them in the same way. Story-teller considers all of them as his 
fathers and we will not find out during the war story, who is actually his biological 
father.
211
 One has to understand that they are representing a nation, thus he is the 
descendant of the entire nation. These soldiers all are killed during the final battle, 
which portrays self-sacrifice for their country and for their ideals.  
The second female character, Masha is portrayed in a way as a contrast to Katya. 
Since her name is a diminutive of Maria, one can say that she is mostly associated with 
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Mary Magdalene.
212
 She is raped by the German captain Kahn, and she is accused of 
being a prostitute by both Russians and Germans. However, she is not portrayed in a 
negative way. In some sense her biggest flaw is that she is beautiful and reminds Kahn 
of his wife. She gives away the food that Kahn brings her to people with whom she 
shares the shelter, however, they still mock her and do not express any sympathy for her 
sufferings. In the end she falls in love with Kahn, who saves her from deportation. 
However, she is killed soon after by a Russian soldier, who denounces her and calls her 
a German “mattress.” She represents a traitor, and here one can see the morale of the 
film. She chooses her life over her country, because she is too weak and frightened. But 
since she is on the “wrong” side, she still will be punished. Comparing Masha’s destiny 
to Katya’s, one can see that readiness to bring sacrifices will be rewarded. 
 The most complicated character we find is Kahn, the German captain. Although 
he is an enemy and he rapes Masha, one can still feel sympathy for him, because he is 
not as inhumane as other Germans portrayed. He falls in love with Masha, and tries to 
help and protect her. His compassionate and philosophical nature is conflicting with the 
tasks he is expected to fulfill, for example to kill the Jews. Kahn has to conquer the 
strategically important house where Katya and the soldiers live. In the last attack he will 
fall together with Russian soldiers. 
 The location of the main action takes place in the “house” and although one 
cannot find any concrete implications to the name, the people who share Russian 
cultural context, recognize it as Pavlov’s house. The story about this house is a “myth” 
in Russian cultural memory that represents the heroic deeds of Sergeant Pavlov, who 
resisted to Germans, despite all the hardships of war and limited equipment. The story 
of Pavlov’s house has been given further mouth to mouth, there are books written about 
it, memoirs, it had its place in the history textbooks and there is a monument for it in 
Stalingrad. However, what is interesting about this heroic story is that originally it also 
promoted multinational narrative, among twenty three soldiers there were nine different 
nationalities fighting together.
213
 This film on the other hand incorporates only ethic 
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Russians, thus changing the war narrative according to the nationalist causes which 
coincides with the present political developments. 
 The way how the connection with Pavlov’s house is made stronger is by 
incorporating image of the fountain “Barmaley” (Бармалей) (also called Crocodile, 
Dancing children etc.) that was located on the square close to the house (25:17; 
01:47:08; 01:55:11). This is a monument with six children dancing around a crocodile 
and holding hands. This image in the film is a replication of a well-known photo made 
by the Soviet photographer E. Yevzerikhin after a German air raid in August 1942.
214
 
This photo is a visual memory of the battle of Stalingrad that is recorded in people’s 
memories.
215
 By portraying this picture, the product of the Second World War cultural 
memory, the film-makers try to bring the film once again closer to reality and reinforce 
their interpretation of the war. It is not a coincidence that the fountain is portrayed in the 
film, because a few months before its release, President Putin personally unveiled the 
restored fountain in Volgograd. According to the journalists, Putin stressed that this is a 
special symbol of the battle of Stalingrad that will always remind the nation that there 
were also losses among children and women.
216
 With saying this, Putin actually 
dismisses the original meaning of the fountain, and prescribes it a new importance. Now 
it commemorates children who died in the war and is thus a war monument. 
 All in all the story line is despite its genre quite static; there is no culmination or 
development of events in the film. There are three face to face battles between Russians 
and Germans that can be considered as central elements of the action. One can see that 
there are causes why these battles start; they are all connected with emotions, revenge in 
particular. For example, the second confrontation develops as a result of burning “Jews” 
on the square by Germans. Russians run into a battle to get their revenge. Similarly, the 
last battle is motivated partly by Masha’s death; this is when Kahn starts to fight as with 
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revenge Russians. The simple story line allows following the film without many efforts, 
it is thus accessible to large masses and easily remembered.  
 The fact that the war story is framed by present time, allows to believe that the 
event is significant in the current society. The reason why the location is present Japan 
is to show the modernization aspect of the contemporary patriotism: Russia is 
developed enough to help the highly modernized country.  
 As already touched in theoretical part – emotions are very influential in regard to 
reception of and remembering the content. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge 
that Stalingrad uses an effective 3D technology to portray an event already important in 
people’s lives, to make it even more present in contemporary Russia. We now see how 
the audience is involved with the story by bringing out some examples of the 
technological choices. 
 There are numerous techniques and special effects that are used to involve 
people with the film and allow viewers to experience the events together with 
characters. For instance, combat and raping scenes are clearly accentuated: many of 
them include slow motion (43:23; 47:22; 53:58; 01:47:41; 01:55:32 min). Similarly, 
there is no sound before the first battle thus indicating that something horrible is going 
to happen next (15:43 min). During the bombing, the sound is muted, imitating the 
result of deafening explosions (24:19; 45:20 min). Bullet movement in slow motion 
(44:45; 01:27:47 min) or targeting audience with guns (9:53; 16:00) indicates the 
ambition to engage viewers and make them feel fear and anxiety. The emotions are also 
amplified by portraying extensive fire, smoking ruins, abandoned houses, and miserable 
people.  
 
Film Music 
 
Music is considered one of the most important ways how to influence people 
emotionally, we further dedicate next part in explaining what choices were made for this 
by the producers. 
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The music of the film was created by the famous film music composer Angelo 
Badalamenti, who is mostly known for working with David Lynch. Among his long list 
of achievements, he has composed music for such films as Blue Velvet, Mulholland 
Drive and Twin Peaks. Badalamenti has received numerous awards and his film 
soundtracks have been very popular. The choice of a composer of this caliber shows 
once again that the producer saw the music as a very important part of the film. By 
influencing viewers emotionally, music plays an important part in both remembering 
the story as well as the emotions of characters. In the case of Stalingrad, the music 
accentuates the feeling of sadness, which can be identified as compassion, but there is 
also beauty behind this sadness that is connected with the heroization of the main 
characters.  
Stalingrad’s background music is instrumental, a song with lyrics appears only at 
the end. When there is music is without lyrics, it allows people to engage with the story 
even more, since they do not have to concentrate on the meaning of the words. And 
since in the end all the action is over, the lyrics are finally allowed. The ending song 
also has a different function than the rest of the film’s music – it has to conclude the 
story and accentuate what was most important to remember from the film. The ending 
song is “The Legend” (Легенда), performed by a famous Russian singer Zemfira. The 
author of the lyrics is Viktor Tsoi who himself is considered to be a legend of Russian 
rock. He was the song writer who performed in the underground band KINO that was 
popular in the 1980s. The song is also the last song from KINO’s bestselling album 
“Blood type” (Группа крови) that came out during Perestroika. One can only assume 
that choosing a popular song from the past, instead of creating a new song particularly 
for this film, was a conscious decision. It was similarly important to select a singer who 
is well known all around the country because of her emotional depth. The personal 
memories and emotions that people had from previously listening to the song or the 
singer are now united with the movie. The song also reinforces the understanding that 
Second World War commemoration has always been a part of postwar Russian culture. 
“The Legend” is not connected with the Second World War, it was written when 
controversies surrounded the Afghan War. However, it still commemorates death and 
speaks about war experience. One can say that here both war experiences have merged 
and there is no difference in which war somebody fought, it was still a difficult and 
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frightening experience. Another possibility is that the connection between the song and 
the Afghan War is now challenged as the song becomes unconsciously part of the 
Second World War commemoration. The memory of a humiliating war is now 
overshadowed by that of the glorious war, and the ending phrases of the film support 
this argument, because the story-teller says he is grateful that thanks to his fathers he 
did not have to experience the war himself, clearly forgetting such wars as the Afghan 
War and the Chechen Wars. 
The music for “The Legend” is very simple, calm piano chords are somewhat 
monotonous and can be interpreted like participating in a procession. The lyrics are in 
Russian, they are sad and tell the story about the end of a battle. The last words of the 
song are very significant, and in some sense they influence the way the Second World 
War should be commemorated:  
“Life is just a word – there is only Love and Death,  
Hey! But who will sing, if everyone is asleep?  
Death is worth living, 
And the Love is worth waiting...” [L.R.]217 
The meaning of the words changes with the context of the film. After watching this 
film, one understands that love is love for motherland, and death is the biggest sacrifice 
you make for your country. Without this context, one can have several other 
interpretations; the patriotic feeling disappears when one looks at these words from the 
perspective of the Afghan War that coincides with the era the song was written. This 
song also strengthens Shpagin’s assertion that in the Soviet Union to die for one’s 
country was the highest goal, the greatest thing one could do.
218
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Narrative Templates 
 
It is now time to address the narratives that are portrayed in Stalingrad to see in what 
ways this film repeats or follows the narratives from the Soviet era and recent decades, 
which patters are used to define the meaning of war. Since narratives help people to 
remember and organize the past, due to the complete set of the story, the schematic 
narratives templates that Stalingrad (2013) portrays will be analyzed here. The language 
of film has two characteristics; one is the repetition of elements, the other the violation 
of the expectations that the audience has.
219
 Therefore, besides repeating the old 
narratives, it is important to see what messages are promoted by bringing in new 
narratives and features. If the narratives are not contradicting the accustomed ones and 
are conventional, the film reinforces the cultural memory and therefore refreshes the 
narratives that are already in the culture. It is similarly important to see what narratives 
are new for Russian Second World War cinema and determine the reasons for 
incorporating these narratives. The film has been made in an era, when Russia is not 
isolated from the influences of Western Second World films, so partly this analysis 
examines the intertextuality and dialog with other national narratives. For understanding 
that patriotism in Russia is related mostly with the heroic portrayal of war, we will also 
point out which narratives are left out by the film-makers for not contradicting the 
widely accepted or preferred war discourses.  
The choice of the narratives was partly motivated by Youngblood’s notion that 
most of Russian Second World War films incorporate following templates: “holy war to 
save the motherland,” “people’s war,” “a battle to the death,” “a war to save Russian 
civilization”.220 These narratives coincide with Russian master narratives as well as with 
elements of Russian patriotism; they are also supported by other researcher, for instance 
Carleton.
221
 Almost all are distinguishable in Stalingrad, however, derived from 
particularly this film, the narrative “holy war to save mother” will be divided into “holy 
war” and “war to save motherland,” for assuring systematical analysis and 
distinguishing two different concepts. “People’s war” narrative will be left out, because 
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it is not as strongly present. Most of this template will be elaborated under the foreign 
narratives, because they are alien to Russians. One also has to keep in mind that many 
of these narratives overlap or they can incorporate different sub themes, depending on 
interpretation. In addition, the aspect of modernization in the contemporary Russian 
patriotism will be illustrated by incorporating Western or foreign narratives that was 
pointed out by Dobrenko.
222
 To offer the context of contemporary war films, one should 
also speak about the forgotten narratives, thus describing what has been portrayed in the 
recent past, but left out from the current work..  
 
Holy War  
 
“Holy war” narrative in Stalingrad shows that God was present, the victory was 
preordained and Russians sacrificed for the right cause. Here one can see that “holy 
war” is first and foremost binary opposition between “good” and “evil” or “Christian” 
and “pagan.” When Kahn motivates his soldiers he says that “God is with us and our 
God is our Fürher, Hitler” (01:22:11 min) which is a direct implication of worshipping 
false god.
223
 Stalingrad also shows that Germans are sacrificing Jews for the ancient 
Germanic gods (41:33 min) and that they are fighting for the wrong cause (to go to 
India where all women have six hands) (01:23:01 min). This accentuates that Russian 
cause was “holy,” because they fought for their freedom and protected their country and 
also supports the view that the Second World War was defensive war, leaving out the 
Soviet attack on Poland and occupation of the Baltic States. 
In the previous part, the connection between Katya and religion was already 
stated. One can see that Katya is under the protection of God: she has survived in a 
house alone despite the heavy bombing and she is the only one who survives this battle 
in the end. She resembles Virgin Mary by her characteristics, the fact that she will have 
a son without the indication to one particular man, makes the story-teller (Sergey) Jesus 
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Christ. And the fact that he is a doctor and a rescuer (savior) could only reinforce this 
connection.  
In addition to semantics of Katya’s name (that means “pure”) and her character, 
film-makers choose to stress her holy features with the help of Russian culture. The first 
time Katya is on the screen, she is dressed as a boy (stating that she tried not to attract 
attention as a woman, tried to keep her virginity), since she frightened and shaking 
soldiers immediately think that she is mentally ill (21:07-22-33). One of the soldiers 
even states that mental illness means she is blessed. With that phrase associations spring 
to mind of the representatives of Russian culture who are connected with the “fool for 
the sake of Christ” (Юродив Христа ради) which means that she is innocent in the 
eyes of God.
224
.  
The Stalingrad battle is made a “holy war” through adding heavy religious 
subtext: the image of pieta (02:01:20 min), soldiers carrying crosses (08:37 min), 
onions as symbols for Orthodox onion-shaped domes (30:06; 01:20:04 min), etc. In the 
beginning of the film, one can see people walking on the water towards the city that is 
in flames. The camera then turns to the witness of this scene who crosses oneself and 
says a short prayer (06:20 min). His companion, knowing that they are just soldiers who 
are floating with their equipment to the other side, jokes that these are apostles. After a 
while he asks, this time already seriously, “aren’t we all apostles in this war?” This 
scene is meaningful, because already in the beginning of the film, one can see that the 
soldiers who fight in the war are sent out on the battleground by God himself so they 
could perform miracles.  
After Russians arrive on the coast they began an attack on the city. Germans 
already anticipated them and as soon as Russians were close they blew up traps stored 
with gasoline. There is picture of city gates (with soviet symbols hammer and sickle) 
and behind the gates there is only fire (15:38-17:10 min), it could be interpreted as the 
gates of hell and indicate on the parallels between hell and the war that Soviet Union 
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had to experience. One can see how Russian soldiers in flames run out of these gates 
with vengeful screams and try to kill as many enemies as possible before they are dead. 
These soldiers also symbolize avenging fire angels, and the connection with religion is 
palpable, since fire refers to presence of God. Moreover, fire could be also interpreted 
as baptism, or ordeal (Matthew 3:11). The parallel between soldiers and angels is also 
articulated by one of the main characters, Polyakov, who calls himself Angel. Soldiers’ 
sacrifice for the country is also rooted in the Christian idea of martyrdom – to reach 
God through suffering. 
As earlier mentioned, Shpagin said that the religion appeared back to people’s 
consciousness together with the Second World War, because it created existential 
questions.
225
 Looking back in time, one can see that wartime film Rainbow (1943) in 
fact included religion. Very important is to point out that here there is clearly stressed 
that God is not on the traitor’s side (“do not touch God, he is not your God”). And 
although after the end of the war religious symbols were not particularly present, the 
cause was still seen as “holy.”  
The incorporation of religion to war narrative may be also explained through the 
commemoration of the dead. Religion not only gives the reason for dying, but 
prescribes how to mourn and allows to believe in “life after death.” The Christian 
approach to commemoration is deeply rooted in the society through the ceremonial 
rituals, thus one can understand that in wartime it was magnified. Incorporation of 
Masha as Mary Magdalene (a woman who mourned Christ) can reinforce the 
connection between religion and commemoration of dead, because women are the ones 
who will be mourning the soldiers lost in battle. Women’s role in society is therefore to 
carry further memory of the war, and memory of soldiers. The story-teller also fits this 
logic: he is both a medium and physical reminder of the war. Such images of women 
and their roles also coincide with Putin’s conservative politics and the patriarchic 
society that the state wishes to build. 
The portrayal of the Second World War as “holy war” serves as a tool for 
nation-building and patriotism. As stated earlier, Anthony D. Smith considers that one 
of the most influential ways to create national identity is to show that they are chosen by 
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God.
 226
 Thus one can understand that in the contemporary Russia, religion is the way to 
channel national identity to people. However, one also has to acknowledge that this is 
similarly important in case of patriotism, because it carries particular values, allows to 
be proud of their heritage and to feel that they are “chosen by God.” In addition, the use 
of religion is necessary for the support of the state and authorities, because patriotism 
was initially connected with the faith in the leader - “father” (patris) as the “substitute 
for God” on Earth.227 Russia has always seen tsar as father of the nation, and as one can 
see the tradition continued also during Soviet Union, who was considered as “father of 
the Soviet nation.”228 The incorporation of religion to this film is thus a product of 
culture but serve to legitimize President Putin’s rule.  
 
War to Save Motherland 
 
Stalingrad’s main theme is connected with protecting homeland, i.e. motherland. The 
main action takes place in Katya’s home and soldiers sacrifice their lives in order to 
protect her and not give her house over to the Germans. Both Katya and her house are 
thus representing motherland.
 229
 Considering that Virgin Mary is Russian patron saint, 
as well as “mother of Christians,” the theme is supported through various connotations. 
The way how Katya receives such a heavy symbolic meaning is actually through a 
above mentioned love story between five soldiers and her. Each soldier sees her 
differently and they have a different bond with her; however this love could be 
described with Ancient Greek world agape: unconditional, spiritual, and self-sacrificing 
love. They protect her together and do not argue with each other when it comes to her 
safety. This is further articulated by captain Gromov, who tells Katya that now they are 
not fighting for homeland or Stalin, but for her, if she dies, they all break (01:07:12 
min).  
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The fact that Katya has a birthday a day before the final battle (01:31:59 min) 
indicates the birthday of a country; it is further strengthened by the probability that the 
story-teller was also conceived on this night. Thus the battle also represents “rebirth” of 
a nation and coincides with Talaver’s notion of “grounding myth.” 230 
Virgin Mary is a Christian symbol, but the Soviet Union also emphasized the 
image of “Mother” or “Mother Russia” – there were numerous war monuments all over 
Soviet Union erected after the war. Stalingrad’s monument “the Motherland Calls!” is 
the biggest in Russia and also symbol of the city. According to Kirschenbaum, mother 
in the Soviet era represented the connection between home and nation, between family 
and state, and in fact, promotion of mother figure appeared during the war, when 
Leninist-Marxist ideals failed to mobilize the nation.
231
 Thus the concept of motherland 
was used as a political tool, to foster patriotism and to motivate people during the war.  
In addition, Katya’s house is also representing the homeland. It seems to be very 
important to protect particularly this house; the whole film is concentrated on the battle 
for the house, not for Stalingrad. The fact that in the end the soldiers ask their own 
people to bomb the house while being in it, just to hold the Russian position, can also be 
interpreted through an historical lens. One has to understand that already the name of 
the Second World War in Russia stresses the narrative: the Great Patriotic War.
232
 It is 
the second patriotic war for Russians, the first one was in 1812, when Napoleon tried to 
invade the Russian Empire. Both of these wars are connected with aggression from a 
modernized Western army, both were held on the Russian soil. In the 1812 war, the 
tactical choice was made from the Russian side to retreat from Moscow and to destroy 
everything so that the French army would not have the resources to sustain itself. 
Similarly, in 1941, Stalin was planning to use the same tactics, in case of a forced 
retreat of the Red Army.
233
 Here, destroying the house seems to be the similar to 
destroying Moscow: it is better to destroy it by “us” than to let enemies benefit from it. 
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All in all, one can see that to bring sacrifices for one’s state is one of the main 
ideas for patriotism. This ensures a loyal nation that is ready to defend the sovereignty 
and thus mobilizes it during difficult times. 
 
A War to Save Russian Civilization 
 
The narrative of “a war to save Russian civilization” is closely linked with the “war to 
save motherland” and with “holy war” as they all stress the ethnic connection with a 
“mythical past” and are necessary for nation-building. Thus the previous parts in a way 
reflect also how the film deals with the current narrative. The concept “Motherland” is 
connected with a particular geographical place, the country of one’s mother or 
ancestors. However, civilization is wider concept, integrating culture and as already 
mentioned in the theoretical part, Russian civilization has its roots in Kievan Rus and is 
mainly connected with Orthodox religion. Therefore, to save Russian civilization means 
to protect particular culture, religion, language, way of life, and ideology. Here, the 
contradiction between Soviet and Russian culture arises: can one say that the Soviet 
Union was essentially Russian civilization? It is widely known fact that the Soviet 
Union tried to detach itself from pre-revolutionary Russian identity, however, the core 
of Soviet culture was still built on previously existing culture. Soviet nation-building or 
the creation of Marxist-Leninist ideology was done mainly by people who grew up in 
Russian cultural context. In addition, Brandenberger notes that Stalin made a conscious 
move toward Russian nation-building after the war, in 1945, by toasting to Russian 
people as “the most outstanding nation of all the nations in the Soviet Union.”234 This 
meant that Stalin saw Russian soldiers as the most patriotic, and defined the war as a 
Russian conflict. Stalingrad illustrates the “Russian war” narrative: all the participants 
are Russians, there are no traces of the Soviet “multicultural” society or army, 
especially regarding Pavlov’s house. Even the woman who is picked out by a German 
because she looks Jewish, says that they are all Russians and there has never been Jews 
(a narrative that essentially denies pogroms and Stalinist campaigns against Jews). 
Similarly, one cannot find the representatives of different Soviet nations in one of the 
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first Stalingrad films such as The Turning Point (1945), which demonstrates that this 
narrative could have been rooted since wartime. Based on these movies, one could say 
that this narrative contradicts both Soviet and Russian master narratives that see the 
society as multinational and the accomplishments of the state as a result of the 
contribution from all ethnicities.235 At the same time it coincides with the nationalist 
politics in the contemporary Russia. 
In addition, “to be civilized” is derived from the word “civilization,” which 
means that the representatives of Russian civilization should be portrayed according to 
this narrative as advanced, developed, educated, wise, etc. There is a perceived 
necessity to respond to the portrayal of Red Army soldiers as “uncivilized” or as 
“savages” and to show that the war was not won by “by coincidence.” For example, the 
portrayal of Russian soldiers in the film A Woman in Berlin (2008) portrayed Russians 
as animals who did not behave in a civilized way: they were raping, looting, they didn’t 
have manners etc. This perception coincides with Estonian master narrative that depicts 
Russians as uneducated and unorganized.236 Furthermore, the image of militarily weak 
Russians can even be observed in the master narratives of nations that have been under 
its rule, such as Estonians, Ukrainians and Georgians.237 One can see that Stalingrad 
argues with these perceptions; here there are smart, resourceful, and mannerly people 
fighting in the war. They are not only good soldiers, but also talented and cultured, for 
example, Nikiforov is a former tenor who performs an aria on Katya’s birthday, and 
somehow he manages to find a suit to wear in a bombed house for this occasion 
(01:34:18 min). The images in Katya’s house show that Russians are educated: the 
collection of butterflies (26:10 min), pictures of Russian writers (58:00 min), piano 
(01:17:35 min), etc.  
The narrative of clever Russians has been there also since the end of the war. 
There are also similarities with the film The Great Turning Point (1945) that portrayed 
Russian commanders as wise and strategic. The most important thing that is brought out 
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by the contemporaries of the film The Great Turning Point is that Soviet regular 
soldiers as well as generals are shown as intelligent people. Thus, it is “enough” to think 
that Germans are culturally superior; instead, the Soviet people have proved that they 
are a great nation.
238
 Stalingrad (2013) clearly accentuates that Russians are smarter and 
braver than Germans. German soldier does what he is told and nothing more. He 
doesn’t think with his own head and this is stressed also by the German army general 
(30:51 min). Kahn is the only soldier that differs from the rest of his comrades; he is 
intelligent, and most of all, he is humane. On the other hand, Russians have to be 
resourceful, in order to fight the enemy without necessary equipment. They are shown 
to plan one shot so that it would bounce back from the tank and blow up the German 
headquarters. 
This narrative also links all previous regimes in Russia with the help of culture, 
by stressing the longue durée of nation and thus coincides with ethnosymbolist 
perception of national identity. For patriotism is also serves as creating pride for 
national cultural past and for the achievements in cultural sphare.  
 
A Battle for Death 
 
The narrative of “a battle to the death” is also linked with previous narrative, to bring 
sacrifices for motherland. One can see that every soldier is killed in Stalingrad; they 
know it from the beginning and they do not seem to have survival instincts. During all 
of the fighting, one can see that although Russians are not well prepared and don’t have 
as much weapons as Germans, they still furiously engage in battle. There are scenes 
where a Russian soldier goes into a fight with only one pistol, at the same time the 
Germans are pointing machine gun fire at him. There is a lot of physical fighting with 
vengeful yelling that is made even more emotional for the audience with the help of 
slow motion.  
                                                          
238
 «Великий перелом»: Выступление Б.Ф.Чирскова по ленинградскому радио о создании фильма 
«Генерал армии».—Из стенограммы обсуждения художественным советом «Ленфильма» фильма 
«Генерал армии» (In English: The Great Turning Point: Chirskov’s Presentation on Leningrad’s radio 
about the creation of film Army General, - From the stenography of the Lenfilm Council of Artist’s 
meeting), accessed on 21.04.2014  http://www.kinozapiski.ru/ru/article/sendvalues/455/ 
 
 
68 
 
The fact that all five protagonists (soldiers) die in the end corresponds also to 
Carleton’s observation about annihilation narratives in present-day Russia. According to 
him, the “victory in death” narrative is linked to both historical and religious features. 
Although the “ultimate sacrifice” also existed in pre-Second World War films, the total 
destructiveness that one can see in Russian film nowadays began as a result of this war 
experience.
239
 Shpagin adds that the horrors of the war changed something in the 
mentality of people; they started to ask existential questions and look for the meaning of 
life.
240
 Martyrdom could be interpreted as an answer to these questions, since it 
explained that those soldiers died for higher cause. Overall, martyrdom seems to be 
something that is characteristic of Soviet and Russian cinema. Youngblood explains that 
this can even be seen as a Soviet style of “happiness” – to sacrifice oneself for the 
state.
241
 The film shows exactly this kind of “happy” ending, five soldiers ask their 
commander to blow up the building they are in, so that the army could hold its 
positions. 
This narrative as one can see is not only connected with the Second World War, 
Fyodor Bondarchuk also uses the same template in 9
th
 Company (2005), thus the 
narrative now is applied also for the new wars. In the contemporary context, it carries 
particular values or lessons, to show that predecessors have brought so many sacrifices 
for you; therefore you should also protect your homeland. 
 
Foreign Narratives 
 
Stalingrad does follow in many instance wartime canons, however, since art is 
connected with cultural context, one can also see influences from previous eras. Films 
from previous decades that were done abroad seemed to have had an especially strong 
effect on the director. There are many themes that have never been touched in the 
Soviet/Russian Second World War films; however they have still found their way to 
Russian cultural memory.  
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The female characters and narratives that are connected with them are actually 
quite unusual from the perspective of the Soviet/Russian tradition. Here, they seem to 
be influenced by the Western Second World War films. For instance, the scenes where 
Masha is raped by the German officer Kahn, turns the film A Woman in Berlin upside 
down: now it is the German who falls in love with a Russian woman, brings her food 
and protects her. Overall, non-combatants have not received much of attention in 
Soviet/Russian war movies, therefore the raping scenes seem to be especially strange. 
This stresses the victimization side, but works also as a reaction to the German portrayal 
of Russians in A Woman in Berlin.  
The portrayal of a German officer as just another victim of war and the Nazi 
regime is similarly new. Kahn is trying to save Jews because he does not understand 
why Germans should kill innocent people. He doesn’t approve the crimes committed by 
SS; this is not how the war should look like. He also doesn’t approve the fact that 
Russians are fighting in order to gain revenge, it does not go together with his 
understanding of warfare. In some ways this film may have been influenced by the 
Joseph Vilsmaier’s Stalingrad (1993), where the protagonist cannot understand the 
cruelties of the Eastern front. One can see that Kahn regrets raping, and sees that the 
war made him an animal. Geoffrey Macnab also sees that the German officer is not 
portrayed according to Russian traditions: the “strange mix of courage and fatalism 
matches that of the Russians who are pitted against him.”242 Russian cinema critic 
Archangelskii thinks that Kahn is brought in because of humanistic considerations: it is 
necessary to show that Germans were humans too. However, the functions that are laid 
on the shoulders of this character do not let him breathe: he is a lover, a rapist, the one 
who thinks with his head, and the one who does what is told, he loves and suffers.
243
  
The incorporation of Jews into Russian Second World War narrative is, 
according to a cinema critic Aprelev, alien to Russian cinema. This topic has been 
“exploited” by the Western filmmakers and finally incorporated into Russian 
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consciousness.
244
 Although, Jews were present in the novel “Life and Fate” that is used 
partly for film Stalingrad, one has to acknowledge that during the Soviet era this book 
was banned. The reason, why Jewish narrative is added may in fact have several 
explanations. One could be seen as conforming to the rest of the world by stressing the 
already accustomed narrative, i.e. “preferred meaning.” The use of Jewish narrative 
would also sell the movie abroad and serve as a tool to introduce Russian perspective of 
the Second World War to a wider audience. Second, it was important to draw parallels 
between Russian and Jewish victimization narratives, to show that not only Jews were 
victims of Nazi persecution. Simultaneously with Jewish narrative, there is also a denial 
of having a Jewish population (Jews have never lived there 40:30 min). One could argue 
that this is trying to minimize the role Jews played in the Red Army and strengthen 
Russian nationalism.  
The narrative of Jews goes hand in hand with the narrative of victimization and 
suffering. The fact that there is portrayal of Germans who gather peaceful residents in 
order to deport them underlines that Russians were victims, therefore contradicting the 
Eastern European narratives that see Russians as perpetrators. The war is seen as 
resistance to the Nazi invasion and goes hand in hand with the postwar “liberation” 
narrative that was imposed on Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union.  
There are also many hints regarding other Western Second World War films. For 
instance, the fact that action starts in Japan is a reminder of Pearl Harbor (2001): 
similar pictures of airplanes against the background of a flaming sun (01:17-01:25 min). 
Stalingrad starts in Japan, where Russians help Germans – this tries to bring the US and 
Russian heroic narratives of war closer, to emphasize that Western powers also 
celebrate the victory of the Second World War. Japan has never received attention in the 
Russian Second World War films, the main enemy has always been Germany. Here the 
scene where Russians are helping two main former enemies of the Allies is also 
showing how progressive and powerful Russia is: it gives humanitarian help to highly 
developed countries and forgives their aggression. This on the other hand creates a self-
image of humane, altruistic, modern and civilized nation. 
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There are also many implications to Enemy at the Gates (2001), the location of 
the battle (the house), the fountain, snipers, love story, etc. Overall way of portraying 
Stalingrad battle and the city in ruins resemble to the previous Western film. One can 
see that the representation of Russians in Enemy at the Gates coincides with the Russian 
narrative of skillful and talented soldiers, thus there was no need to contradict, but 
instead to reinforce it. There is, however a difference in inclusion of Soviet symbols: 
Western version portrays many soviet flags and Stalin’s figures, while Russian film tries 
to avoid it. One can interpret this as distancing itself from the Soviet ideology, at the 
same time promoting state’s achievements. 
The connection with Western Second World War movies is even stronger due to 
the actor who plays captain Kahn, Thomas Kretschmann. Kretschmann has acted in 
numerous Western war films, and it is not therefore a coincidence that Bondarchuk 
chose him to portray the only positive enemy. Kretschmann has had roles in Stalingrad 
(1993), The Pianist (2002), In Enemy Hands (2004), Eichmann (2007) and Valkyrie 
(2008) – most of which are known to the Russian public. Since all of these films portray 
Nazis in a bad light, they are not taken as controversial in Russian as, for instance, A 
Woman in Berlin (2008). 
One can see that film-makers try to engage in dialogue with previous films and 
to make a statement what is “true” and what is not, in addition it also resembles 
Medinsky’s (current Ministry of Culture, who supported the film) approach to speak out 
against the “false” foreign portrayal of the Second World War. This in fact stresses that 
films considered important for reinforcing memory of the war. However, the connection 
with Western films also stresses the parallels between the celebration of victory in the 
Allied countries and indicates that Russians should not speak bad about the war, since 
other countries also portray it in heroic way.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
Conclusion 
 
To summarize this chapter, one can see that in the case of the film Stalingrad, 
the choices made indicates that the filmmaker does try to influence people emotionally. 
The film is easily followed; it has a simple plot, clear positive characters that people can 
identify with. It also incorporates references to the monuments, stories and pictures, that 
people are already aware of, thus allowing audience to make their associations. 
Similarly, if the story follows the line of conventional representation of the heroic war, 
it serves as an addition to the previous knowledge about the Stalingrad battle. The 3D 
technology engages audience, music and narrative strengthen involvement by playing 
on the emotions. However, functioning together in one film, these components all help 
to remember the events portrayed and have the potential to influence the interpretation 
of the war. Since people are emotionally involved and the 3D technology amplifies the 
feeling of “being there” and “participating in it”, they start to believe that these things 
actually happened in the way they were portrayed.  
Stalingrad is a cultural product that speaks about the mythical history of a 
nation, about an event that is foundational to contemporary Russian identity. By 
showing one story to millions of people the film creates also a bond among the 
population, who will now have a shared memory of the event. It gives people a 
necessary “myth” to inspire pride, and it therefore fosters patriotic feelings. One can see 
that most of the elements of the contemporary patriotism do exist in Stalingrad: 
patriarchic society, modernization, self-sacrifice for the greater cause, heroic nation, 
religion and nationalism. The superiority of Russians are also accentuated through 
portraying them resourceful, talented and civilized. By applying these narrative 
templates Stalingrad also reinforces patriotism, since it does not only transfer particular 
values or ideology, but also shows what kind of sacrifices are brought by the ancestors.  
Analyzing Stalingrad in the context of the development of the Second World 
War discourses, one should not set aside what narratives are left out. In the case of 
cultural memory one can see it as “forgotten.” The pluralistic interpretation of the war 
that started to appear at the end of the 1980s: the penal battalions, negligence of the 
commanders, starving, unprepared and ill-equipped soldiers, the destiny of the POWs, 
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prisoners as “suicide troops” are not included. It can be explained by the fact that these 
narratives were never accepted by the majority and thus did not become dominant or 
preferred narratives. In addition, “people’s war” narrative that Yougblood brought out is 
not emphasized: one can see women and children living in the basement, but audience 
does not bond with them, this mainly serves as an illustration Masha’s suffering, on the 
other hand are not connected with the Russian or Soviet traditions. Portrayal of civilians 
and individual suffering of soldiers that appeared during thaw-era, is thus left 
untouched, except for the life stories provided by the story-teller. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this thesis was to show how the memory of the Second World War was used 
in the contemporary film Stalingrad in order to foster patriotism. From the perspective 
of cultural memory, one has to acknowledge that the film is either a medium for 
reinstating old or creating new cultural memory, as well as the product of cultural 
memory. The film was supported by the state and can therefore also be seen as a tool for 
fostering “official” memory of the war, as well as for creating national identity and 
patriotism on the basis of the Second World War victory. 
The authorities knew already during the Soviet era how influential film is in 
creating national identity and patriotism, especially during the time when the masses 
were illiterate. The ideology was channeled through films to all corners of the state with 
the help of the “agit-trains.” Similarly, in contemporary Russia, the role of films in 
creating a unifying identity, is recognizable. The Second World War is a “myth”, a story 
about glorious victory and heroic nation. One can see that it is central in Russian 
national identity: when during the era of glasnost, people started to receive different 
interpretations of the war it started to undermine their faith in the country. When the war 
commemoration was stopped for a while on the state level, people also were deprived of 
their “myth.” With Putin’s administration, the Second World War reinstated as the 
greatest achievement in country’s history, for enhancing the image of the state among 
the population. The biggest concern for the Russian authorities nowadays is to forbid 
the negative portrayal of the Red Army that diminishes the role the Soviet Union played 
in the war as well as the sacrifices the nation has made. Thus, the law was introduced 
that criminalizes interpretations not suitable for the authorities. One has to see 
Stalingrad as both the result of state promotion and as the product of people who share 
the cultural context. 
 This thesis not only looked at the film from the contemporary viewpoint, it tried 
to explain it in the context of the Russian culture and history. Therefore, the analysis 
also incorporated older war films from the Soviet era. The research found that the 
strongest link is created with the wartime narratives that accentuate the war as heroic 
and defensive. The soldiers are not showed as humane and suffering, instead they are 
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the true heroes who are able to die for their country and defeat the Nazi army. The most 
important narrative that the film-makes emphasize is the “holy war,” which is achieved 
by incorporating religious symbols. This on the other hand reassures the nation of being 
“chosen” and thus serves well in fostering patriotism. “War to save motherland” 
narrative is created by portraying love story between Katya and the five soldiers. Here 
Katya is symbolizes “motherland” and love story respectively, love for homeland. To 
protect one’s homeland is the most important task of a patriot and this narrative tries to 
emphasize it, by stressing that the heroes were all ready to sacrifice their lives for 
Katya. “War to save Russian Civilization incorporates nationalist viewpoint as well as 
the feeling of superiority over other nations due to the long cultural heritage. This serves 
to unify all previous regimes with the help of culture and religion.  
 The connections with Western cinema showed the important features of the 
Second World War that the film-makers included satisfying to the contemporary 
viewers’ needs as well as stating the modernization of Russian cinema. The Western 
Second World War narratives are also influencing Russian cultural memory through 
Hollywood or European blockbusters. It is important to emphasize that Stalingrad has a 
dialog with these films, by either contesting some narratives or incorporating others. 
The intertextuality with the films A Woman in Berlin, Pearl Harbor and Jewish 
narratives, has the ambition to introduce the Russian perspective to the world. The 
American patriotic narrative and heroic achievements also justify Russian patriotism, 
since they both are considered to be the winners of the Second World War. 
 In addition to the narratives, it was also important to explain how the film tries 
to influence cultural memory through the technological solutions. There are conscious 
choices made to give the audience the sense of “being there” and “experiencing” the 
war by screening it in 3D cinema. The story is made even more emotional by adding 
appropriate melodramatic music and special effects. The structure of the narrative 
showed that it is simple and easy to follow. 
All in all, the film Stalingrad was a 2013 blockbuster, which means that people 
consider the war memory important and saw film as an appropriate way to portray it. 
The fact that the Second World War is so strongly connected with Orthodox religion for 
contemporary Russians shows that cultural memory of Russians unites the Soviet era 
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war with the Old Russian culture. The commemoration of the dead has been always 
connected with the church, and even if during the Soviet era religion was not allowed, 
the official narrative still needed to give explanations for the suffering and sacrifices 
through a “holy war” prism. This is why for contemporaries the Orthodox Church was 
also there during the war, and it is not conflicting with their cultural memory. Here, no 
one stresses that the war is not portrayed “accurately,” since it seems to be appropriate 
to insert religious symbols instead of the Soviet symbols. 
 The Battle of Stalingrad has been a popular topic for war movies, however this 
film is one of the  had long been portrayed in Soviet cinema since the end of the Second 
World War and it has been a popular topic in literature. Besides the portrayal of the 
greatest battle in the Soviet era, the contemporary Russian as well as the Western 
cinema has also dedicated films on this topic. Moreover, the Second World War is very 
important part of nation-building, identity and memory not only in Soviet Union and 
contemporary Russia, it has played its own part in other countries that participated in 
the war. It is important to note that contemporary Russia is not the only country where 
the war arouses patriotic feelings and sense of pride. This can be similarly found, for 
instance, in movies made in the US. 
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